

DAMAGE BOOK

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_218151

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

THE WORLD OF TO-DAY

THE
TREATY SETTLEMENT
OF EUROPE

SOME GEOGRAPHIC AND
ETHNOGRAPHIC ASPECTS

BY
H. J. FLEURE

Professor of Geography and Anthropology, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth
Honorary Secretary to the Geographical Association

HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW COPENHAGEN
NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPE TOWN
BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS SHANGHAI PEKING

1921

CONTENTS.

PREFACE

CHAPTER I. A SHORT SURVEY OF EUROPE

CHAPTER II.	FRONTIERS AND THEIR PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE PARIS BASIN AND THE RHINE.	20
	The Rhine	23
	Alsace	25
	Lorraine	26
	Saar Basin	29
	Supplementary Notes on Alsace, Lorraine, and the Saar	30
	The German Portions on the Left Bank of the Rhine	31
	Luxembourg	31
	Belgium—	
	1. The Eastern Frontier	32
	2. Wallony	34
	3. Flanders	35
	4. Antwerp and the Scheldt	36
	5. Further Notes	37
CHAPTER III.	SLESVIG AND THE PORTS AND RIVERS OF THE GERMAN PLAIN.	39
	Slesvig	39
	Ports and Rivers of the German Plain.	40
CHAPTER IV.	THE EASTERN BORDER OF EUROPE-OF-THE-SEA.	43
	Finland	44
	The Åland Islands	49, 81
	Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania	50
	Esthonia	50
	Latvia	52
	Lithuania	53
	Poland	54
	The Polish Frontiers—	
	1. The West	57
	2. Danzig	58
	3. Poland and East Prussia	58
	4. Poland and Lithuania	58
	5. Upper Silesia	59
	6. D ^u ccin, etc.	59
	7 The East	60
	8. The South-East: Poland and the Ukraine	60

	PAGE
CHAPTER V. DANUBIAN LANDS.	63
The Danube	63
Roumania	64
Czechoslovakia	67
Austria	69
Hungary	70
Italian Gains and the Adriatic Settlement .	72
The Balkan Peninsula	74
The Balkans—	
1. Albania	76
2. Yugoslavia	76
3. Bulgaria	78
4. Greece	78
5. A General Note	79
Constantinople	79
The Mediterranean	80
A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY	82

M A P S

FIGURE	PAGE
1. SOME FEATURES OF THE NATURAL VEGETATION OF EUROPE.	9
2. THE RHINE LANDS	11
3. WATERWAYS AND INDUSTRY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE .	27
4. THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF BELGIUM.	33
5. CHANGES IN SLESVIG.	41
6. FINLAND	45
7. BORDERLANDS OF RUSSIA	51
8. PROGRESSIVE GERMANISATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES. .	55
9. DANUBIAN LANDS.	62
10. ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA.	73
11. THE BALKAN PENINSULA	75

PREFACE

This little book attempts to give indications of the meanings of some of the chief territorial changes in Europe after the war of 1914-18.

The treaties have attempted to settle Europe in a new and, largely, a linguistic frame, and, in that way, have tried to do some justice to nationalist aspiration, but, beyond vague clauses in the Covenant of the League of Nations, there has been little thought of avoidance of future wars by the encouragement of widespread aspirations, especially of the humbler folk, towards a growth of European unity.

The state, as we have known it, has been provocative of war by the exclusiveness on which it is based, and some think it needs to be tempered by the creation, not of a super-state, but of the inter-state Court of Justice which many small nations, often the real trustees of civilization, so ardently desire. The unfortunate, but characteristic, opposition of the dominant states, whose power would be greatly reduced were it to be instituted as a reality, is delaying if not defeating this hope of peace. The same dominant states have so framed the economic sides of the treaties as to make the rise of unity difficult, and the recurrence of war almost inevitable; but that aspect of the disillusionment of the peoples could not be touched upon within the compass of this little sketch.

While bitterly complaining of the results of the work of politicians, it would however be ungenerous not to recognise the immense difficulties of their task, performed under conditions of fatigue, poverty and irritability by men calamitously unprepared for the task of arranging for the lives of other peoples with problems different from their own. And it would be unjust not to admit that often enough the real power seems to lie not among the politicians who bear the brunt of the criticisms, but among industrial and financial magnates behind the scenes.

TREATY SETTLEMENT OF EUROPE

SOME GEOGRAPHIC AND ETHNOGRAPHIC ASPECTS

CHAPTER I.

A SHORT SURVEY OF EUROPEAN LIFE.

GEOGRAPHERS emphasise contrasts between the dry Interior of Eurasia, which has had cities and settled life only during the wetter periods, and its rainier maritime fringes with their continuous accumulation of settled civilisation. The fringes include China, Indo-China, India, and West Europe, which has a climate mildened by Atlantic westerlies and by the deep penetration of Baltic and Mediterranean Seas.

Western Europe's boundaries are a transition zone with lowland swamps stretching south from the Gulf of Finland past the great Pripet swamps to the south. The transition is from an immense interior plain with severe climate, which almost enforces hibernation and certainly limits mental efficiency at the extremes of heat and cold, to a fringing region where man keeps intellectually active all the year round, and where juxtaposition of mountain, plateau, valley, plain, peninsula and island, involves divergences and exchanges of thought and habit within small areas.

Within "Europe of the Sea" the settled life has given the people a stake in the soil, and wholesale movements have long ceased. The immense stretches of the interior plains give a sameness to life over large areas, and do not prohibit mass movements. Russia is transitional but we enter Europe-of-the-Sea west of a line from the Gulf of Danzig to Bukovina and the Carpathians, where the beech tree appears in the forests. The hardier oak spreads eastwards into the parts of Russia which are not screened from the wet westerlies by either Scandinavia or the Carpathians, *i.e.*, into a wedge (Fig. 1). of summer rainfall based on the Vistula, and pointing to the south end of the Urals. This oak country has a climate allowing growth of wheat; the beech is an index of varied possibilities of cultivation.

Wheat is an exacting crop, and, in Europe North of the Alps, the chemical action of solar rays on the soil is too slow to avoid dangers of diminution of fertility. It is thus a region which has needed supplements to cultivation, and these have been found in fishing, in trade arising therefrom, and in manufacture, growing in its turn from trade, the latter stage being accentuated by utilisation of coal. From being a population dependent on wheat and stock-raising we have thus become increasingly dependent on the tropics for raw material, for feeding stuffs for men and cattle and for fertilisers. Competition between would-be dominant exploiters of these products contributed much to the war of 1914-18, in which they were destroyed on an unprecedented scale.

Europe's civilisation grew largely around the Mediterranean coasts with their opportunities of exchange of ideas. The other sea, the Baltic, seems to have made more spasmodic contributions, and its climate has varied from time to time. The continuity of Mediterranean life has been greater and its ancient heritage was largely summed up for us, for good and ill, by Rome. From Rome the more civic element spread over south France, the administrative and imperial one reached the Rhine and Danube, and the ecclesiastical continuation




FIG. 1. SOME FEATURES OF THE NATURAL VEGETATION OF EUROPE.

of Rome's spreading influence stretched past one Mark after another to the limits of Europe-of-the-Sea.

The northern boundary of the continuous civic tradition may be said to cross France from La Rochelle to Lyons, and, by studying limits of the langue d'oc, the droit-écrit, and so on, we could show that a frontier is really a zone. A linear frontier must be unsatisfactory as a frame for human activities, and its importance should be minimised and not accentuated by political effort.

The Rhine and Danube, with their frontier posts becoming the ecclesiastical cities (Fig. 2) Cologne, Coblenz, Mainz, Speyer, Passau, formed the effective boundary of Roman administration and of Roman influence during the formative period of language, and we need but think of Flanders, Lorraine and Austria, to see that this line is marked with Europe's blood. To the north-east of these two great rivers the climate is distinctly colder in winter, the culture of the vine becomes sporadic, and immense forests still existed within historic times. With forest clearing the Roman tradition was spread eastwards, largely by the church and its abbeys, but its more spiritual advances were met only slowly for want of the Roman background. Consequently in this direction the church became increasingly alien, aristocratic, military, as symbolised by the inclusion of the cathedral within the castle at Prague and Cracow, and this tendency reached a head with the Christianising of the south-east Baltic plain (1226 onwards) by the Teutonic knights.

We thus attain the east limit of Europe-of-the-Sea beyond which the peoples have been accustomed to look south to Constantinople via Kiev, rather than west to Rome via Vilna and Gniezno (Gnesen) or Cracow, *i.e.*, they are of the Orthodox Church. In the border zone, Transylvania and Ukraine developed the Uniate Church between the Roman and the Orthodox, with an old Slavonic ritual, but also an acknowledgment of Rome.

Behind these two great frontiers of administrative Rome and ecclesiastical Rome are people imbued with




FIG. 2. THE RHINE LANDS.

NOTE : Since the above map was made it has been decided to fix certain spellings as follows :—
Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Basle, Trier (for Treves), the others as above.

the spirit of the defender of civilisation against barbarism. This frontier feeling is strong in Lorraine, intensely and stubbornly French despite its roads into Germany, and it is even stronger in East Prussia, Poland and Roumania. Political action is liable to humour this feeling unduly and so to intensify the importance of frontiers that common sense as well as goodwill would seek to blur.

It is West of the Rhine, where the Roman influence was felt on language in the formative period, that the ideas of nation and state have been especially developed. The nation can be usefully conceived as a fairly large group of people with increasingly varied activities bound together by ties of language, custom, tradition or common sacrifice, in most cases upon a basis of neighbourhood. The state is the group-organisation providing for the adjustment and expansion of many aspects of life ; it has a territorial basis and the tendency is towards linguistic unity. The mixture of these two ideas has too often led to hostilities and suspicion between the different units, followed by the emphasising of their linear frontiers. A result is that the life of Europe is always struggling in the hard frame of the last treaty-settlement which the movement of life soon makes out of date. Frontiers are really broad zones, and linear abstractions should be subject to easy and repeated adjustment, but the ambition of the sovereign nation-state makes this difficult. The sovereignty of the small nation-state is tempered a good deal in practice ; the discussions on the International Court of Justice at Geneva recently showed that the Big-Nations Question is the one which makes the "White Peril," the menace to civilisation.

East of the Rhine the coincidence of nation and state has been by no means close, and the idea of the nation-state, triumphant in France through the Revolution of 1789, has seethed in Central Europe of the nineteenth century, suffering severe checks from champions of stability, like Metternich. The treaties of 1919-20 may be said to represent a fairly honest attempt, so far as territory is concerned, to apply to Central Europe,

and, at least, to discuss for the Transition Zone to the Interior and for the Balkans, the idea of the sovereign nation-state as it has arisen in the West.

The misfortune remains that this idea, as we have known it, is almost out of date. Firstly, the linguistic basis has nearly always been chosen as the index of vital associations, regardless of economic and other facts. Secondly, the idea of the sovereignty of the nation-state has been maintained and applied with very little reserve save in the case of some ex-enemies. There has been but a little vague thinking concerning serious practical limitations of sovereignty for the sake of ultimate unification of Europe. The disastrous muddles made by British Governments in Ireland have shown how little the idea of unity-in-diversity has been thought out by politicians, and we have to realise that in Europe we can have only unity-in-diversity.

For the growth of such unity, the frontier lands West of the Rhine and West of Russia could be invaluable helpers, because they are intermediate,—with allegiances, in different aspects of their life, to both sides; but our present out-of-date political system emphasises their poorer aspects, and makes them too often barriers and sources of quarrels.

The growth of settled civilisation North of the Alps was largely dependent upon the clearing of the forest of oak and beech, and this required hard and sharp weapons, so it can hardly be said to have begun till 1000 B.C., or thereabouts (last phase of Bronze Age), whereas 3000 B.C. is the date usually suggested for the rise of Ægean civilisation and the inauguration of Mediterranean life and movement on a comprehensive scale. In Western and Central Europe forest-conquest was speeded up by iron, and the Roman roads showed the hill and forest peoples ways to come down and break the Empire. Villages of settled cultivators arose at the foot of the hills and in the plains, but, near the greater hills, the habit of seasonal movement up and down hill continued in many parts, and with this persisted the idea of a kinship basis

of society, whereas, among the villagers, it gave place to a basis of neighbourhood. The importance of seasonal wanderings in the Balkan peninsula is a valuable indication of the persistence of early phases of social organisation, correlated with the immense proportion of hill-land in the peninsula. Lowland clearings long provided homes for the enforced emigrants from the hill lands in many parts of Europe, so the hill-lands with their limited ability to support population have often remained true to ancient ways, while the more open lowlands have moved faster with the centuries.

The great peasant motto is "J'y suis, j'y reste" and the villagers of non-Mediterranean Europe have nearly all passed through a phase of exclusive absorption in local affairs, but, with even a little development of communications, associations of adjacent groups came to have common memories, dialects, customs, and aspirations, and common relations to the forest wanderers who sought to dominate them and whose adventures form a large element of the Heroic Age in literature. In this way the first sketching of the future nation-states began. The most typical developments were on the English plain and on the Paris Basin. From the English plain the idea spread, with struggle and compromise, over Britain, especially after 1264, but our country has been slow to recognise that British Nationality cannot spread in the same way over Ireland: the divergences are too deep. In the Paris Basin the piecemeal substitution of Capetian and Valois for Anglo-Norman rule (1200-1453) and the subjection of feudatories was accompanied, also piecemeal, by forest-clearing and the assertion of the central over the local authority. The process grew to emphatic expression under the Bourbons (1598 onwards) and made France "la grande nation." Defence passed into aggression and it was largely fear of France that gave Prussia the great incentive to follow suit from the days of the great Elector (1640-88) onwards. XIXth century railways pressed on this movement in Germany, and in Italy, where the inheritance from the city state

had so long hindered growth of the nation-state. The state claiming to be the nation-state has thus become the feature of West European organization and its ambitions the bane of our civilization. Intermediate units have in most cases been absorbed by the greater powers, especially in Central Europe till, during the period 1871-1914, the great states stood confronted along linear boundaries sharpened by manifold irritations. It is a misfortune of the first magnitude that in the recent peace-treaties it was found possible to do, even to suggest, nothing to diminish the importance of these artificial lines in the main because of jealousy of the big nations as to their sovereignty and their consequent suspicion of the International Court of Justice.

The nation-state may be said to be built up on an agricultural foundation and this original character has persisted remarkably in the case of France. Everywhere in Europe - of - the - Sea experience taught the people that the fertility of the soil was hard to maintain, and agricultural experiments broke the traditionalism of the village, but even better cultivation could not save the situation. Supplements were found in fishing, and industry and sea-trade grew out of fisheries. This change diminished men's links with the small closed communities, into definite positions in which they had previously been born in most cases. Society in the little village and the country made up of villages was based on status. In the new industrialist state, labour has become the great medium of exchange, however disguised, and society has come to be based increasingly on contract. The change from status to contract in recent centuries is as characteristic of Western Europe as was the earlier one from kinship to neighbourhood as a basis of organization.

Under the new industrialist conditions, western Europe has become increasingly dependent upon distant lands for foods, raw materials and fertilizers, and her coal has become almost more important than her soil. The different countries have reacted differently but,

especially in Britain, the industrial system has led to neglect of agriculture and of the village population, the state has become much more urban with marked tendencies to a deep division between people with capital or highly developed skill and a floating population of labourers and agents selling its labour by contract. From the very nature of the industrial system, its difficulties increase with the years and with the ever-increasing unification of the world market for raw materials, finished products and credit facilities. There is thence a marked tendency to draw the powers of the nation-state more and more into the economic struggle and this is an increasing source of irritation and a factor of possible wars. This tendency has been particularly noticeable in Germany, where it undoubtedly contributed to the efficiency of German industrialism with its determined effort to balance industry and agriculture, but the same path was being trod in the case of Britain, and competition and irritation between the two great and precarious systems were ever increasing to the world's detriment until 1914.

Our common dependence on distant lands, realised to an extent insufficient to make us seek agreement and economic co-operation, seems in the main to have been an irritant that has led the rival teetotums to whirl faster and faster and so to become more dangerous. The immediate profits to the more fortunate industrialist have at the same time raised standards of living in a society loosed from its old moorings and this has led to struggle for raised standards and shorter hours among the labourers and so to a further increase of irritation. The concentration of financial power in industrialist western Europe has led to exploitation of Russian peasants, negroes, and many other providers of raw material and, so long as Europe remains divided into hostile camps, there seems little hope of our rising to a level of real trusteeship for tropical and other lands. The weakness of application of magnificent ideas set forth in Articles xxii. and xxiii. of the Covenant of the League of Nations is sufficient indication of this.

Co-operation is, if possible, even more needed in commerce, in the distribution of raw products to the various industrial regions, in the organisation of credit, in the care of the people and the maintenance of a healthy rural life. Before 1914 the credit arrangements of Europe had become so delicate that they were knitting peoples together in spite of frontiers and were threatening the sovereignty of the state. Their influence in bringing people together was, perhaps, especially notable in the region of electrically applied water-power on the flanks of the Alps in South Germany, Switzerland and North Italy. The war and, even more, the treaties have sundered peoples once more, and have reinvigorated the old feelings of distrust. To overcome this we can only look to better education in the understanding of one another's mode of life and one another's language, for lack of understanding of language is one of the greatest factors of division of feeling, as our politicians have seen; their new frontiers are largely linguistic ones, with a few marked exceptions.

Industrialism has in the main spread from west to east along the zone of coalfields from Britain to Russia, just below the northern flanks of the hills of Central Europe. It has transformed Britain far more than France: its transformation of Germany was being more controlled by the state there than in the other two industrial countries named. In England and France it found the nation strongly self-conscious and provided with a long tradition, in Germany it contributed enormously to the making of that tradition.

Further east it found people still almost without national consciousness in some parts or with a substitute for it provided by the frontier-spirit in others. Along this eastern zone of transition to the great Interior the old problems of the west were still alive, the land-hunger of the peasantry, communal ownership and individual holdings, dues to the nobility and the like were the subjects of discussion when industrialism supervened. Thus it has happened that the idea of

the sovereign nation-state was to a large extent out of date before it had really come into existence in this zone, but the treaties evidently look forward to an evolution in this eastern zone similar to that which has been suffered by the west.

The extreme delicacy of the industrial system and of its credit arrangements has made the organization get out of gear through the stress of war and blockade and reparation discussions. The basic activities of agriculture have suffered less, and on the whole it would seem that the hold on the land has gone increasingly to those who work it, and this whether we think of western or of central or even of eastern Europe. The probability is that this may mean more food for the peasantry of eastern Europe rather than larger exports of crops to western Europe, but though that makes difficulties for us it is a development with great possibilities of good.

The war has more than ever demonstrated to European Industrialism that it has increasingly powerful rivals outside its borders and this together with the difficulties of the food-quest will make it seek before long a way out of its suicidal quarrels even though higher motives, as is their wont, fail to maintain their driving power.

In this book little will be said about race questions, because the terms applicable in them are so misused in political discussions. Practically all European populations exhibit types of diverse origins living and maintaining those type-characters side by side in spite of inter-marriage and of absence of any consciousness of diversity. These various types, each with mental aptitudes and limitations that are in some degree correlated with their physique, make diverse contributions to the life of each people. The proportions of the various elements vary from place to place, but it is folly to think of Latin, Anglo-Saxon, Teutonic, Slavonic and other groups, as though the possessors of these languages showed a marked unity due to common descent. It would be a great

advance if the adjectives just mentioned were no longer used in connection with the term "race."

The task of this book must of necessity be, in the main, a survey of the new frontiers, with notes on the life and problems of the new states and much-altered states which the treaties have brought into existence, and any treatment of France, Italy, Germany and Britain is impossible. None the less, one cannot close this introduction without a reference to an immense economic change, so deep as to have become a geographical one. The patient labour of centuries had conquered the forest in northern France, and made it a land of varied cultivation and industry. The war has laid it waste, and man must reconquer it and re-adapt it to his needs. The awfulness of this change has burnt itself into the souls of the French people, and this accounts in a very large measure for the uncompromising attitude of their spokesmen in the peace negotiations. It is a misfortune that attention was not more clearly focussed on this tremendous problem from the very day of the Armistice. France had suffered for the freedom of the world, and the restoration of her wasted lands was a task for co-operative effort if ever there were one. Even now the acceptance of this duty by all the nations could ease a situation which has been aggravated by growing irritation during the two years since the cessation of hostilities. Its performance would do a great deal towards the rehabilitation of the economic life of western Europe, and would make possible revisions of treaties and decisions which are already showing signs of becoming creators of future wars.

CHAPTER II.

FRONTIERS AND THEIR PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE PARIS BASIN AND THE RHINE. (*Fig. 2.*)

FOLLOWING the suggestions in the introductory chapter, we take first the frontier zone of the Roman Empire considered broadly, and note especially its important association with the language problem as already hinted above.

The right bank of the Rhine from Basle downwards is unquestionably Germanic in the full sense, though Rome possessed for a while the Agri Decumates, now a large part of Baden and Württemberg. The Germanic spread across the Rhine had to pass the Roman filter of the cities already named along the river (p. 10), but it remained nevertheless for some distance a Germanic spread. The Paris Basin lost some of its Roman character for a while when the rural Franks came in during the fifth and sixth centuries, but the Church brought back the older and more civic tradition, and finally re-established the Roman character of that basin wherein grew the nation-state of France. The Germanic spread affected most particularly the lowland ways west of the Rhine, and, as forests were cleared and the people attached themselves to the soil, the distribution of languages became fixed in a frame which has altered very little in subsequent centuries. Alemannic (one of the sources of German) established itself on the Alsatian Lowland, Alemannic or sometimes Low German became fixed along the lower ways through the Hardt, on the lower Moselle and its feeders in the fantastic agglomerate of principalities which were swept away by the French Revolution, and afterwards (1815) reorganised as Rhenish Prussia. Low German also spread north of the Ardennes right away to Flanders. The hill country of Wallony (the Ardennes) kept an old Romano-Celtic speech which drew it more and more to

the French side, and Lorraine, behind the forested heights of Hunsrück and Hardt, became still more clearly French. In recent centuries German has spread a little way up from the Alsatian plain into the Vosges at Markirch, while, until 1871, French was being increasingly used by educated Alsatians. In Lorraine the French boundary moved forward against German until it reached the hills on the left bank of the Saar basin, and the greater part of Lorraine thus became French speaking. The ways through the Côtes de Meuse and Côtes de Moselle, and especially that of Verdun-Metz, are important here, and it was only immigrant officialdom that made Metz seem German between 1871 and 1914.

Low German spread up the Moselle and Sure (Sauer) into Luxembourg, but historic associations with Wallony, and the attractions of French thought, spread the latter language among that country's bourgeoisie. North of Luxembourg the plateau is German and is called the Eifel mainly in so far as it drains to the Moselle, and Walloon French with the name of the Ardennes in so far as it drains to the Meuse. This Ardennes plateau is the essential Wallony, flanked of old on the north-west by great forests in Hainaut and, to some extent, in Brabant. The clearing of the forest has been a characteristic task of the Walloons, whose language thus spread westward. Apart from this, there has been little change, save that Flemish has retreated slowly, and Flanders has tended to bi-lingualism, especially since Walloon has practically assimilated itself to French.

This great projection of Walloon-French speech has hindered the evolution of Flemish, which is still largely a collection of dialects, though it is striving to establish a literary standard and is related to literary Dutch.

In religion, Alsace, in spite of Swiss associations, is only one quarter Protestant. Lorraine, with its frontier spirit, is a bulwark in religion as in war of the land that was of old the eldest daughter of the Church. The Bavarian Palatinate on the other hand, between Hardt and Hunsrück, is extremely Protestant, with a large

Jewish element, especially in that part which was handed over to Hesse-Darmstadt in 1815. The Moselle region with the city of Trier and Rhenish Prussia are largely Catholic, and so are Wallony and Flanders. Lorraine and Flanders have, however, lost Protestant elements through persecution, and British industry has gained greatly by their immigration. On the whole, the intermediate zone is more Protestant than the Paris Basin, but less so than the lands beyond the Rhine. Language and religion are not specially linked, though a fully French Protestant is rare; the Roman cities of the Rhine have, however, kept a large German population Catholic.

The divergence of linguistic and religious and other frontiers, and the intertwining of Romance and Germanic elements in our zone, gives it its tragic interest as a battleground of rival claims. The French Revolution (1789) swept away many servitudes and was welcomed along the left bank of the Rhine, and a continuation of its enthusiasm might have Gallicised large areas, but German organisation after 1815 put this out of the question, save in Alsace, which, however, is definitely Germanic in speech.

Modern industry has conspicuously altered problems between the Paris Basin and the Rhine. Antwerp is the best entry into North France and the Rhine and Ruhr districts, all of which need easy transport to its docks; and the Scheldt question is thus most important internationally, though the French Government is trying to make obstacles to the use of Antwerp by its nationals.

Already by 1871 some iron was mined in that part of Lorraine which Germany violently annexed, but English inventions of the period 1875-8 (for utilising Middlesbrough ore) made useful certain phosphoric iron ores found partly within what still remained French Lorraine. The ore is called Minette, and usually contains about 35 per cent. of iron. Lorraine has at hand the limestone needed for fluxing.

IRON ORE (1913).—(See Fig. 3.)				
France (1913)	{	France, Outside Minette Field	1,900,000 tons	
21,700,000 tons	{	" Minette Field	19,800,000 "	} Minette Field 48,200,000 plus a little from the small part in Belgium.
		Luxembourg, Minette Field	7,300,000 "	
Germany (1913)	{	Germany, Minette Field	21,100,000 "	
28,800,000 tons	{	" (Outside Minette Field)	7,500,000 "	

If production can be restored, France will have 42,800,000 tons, and Germany, 7,500,000, with post-war boundaries ; Britain produces 16,000,000 tons of iron ore, and U.S.A., 60,000,000. The Minette Field supplies 29 per cent. of the world's iron ore and, as a result of the war, France, which also has nearly 2,000,000 tons of iron ore produced in North Africa, becomes one of the greatest sources of the world's iron. Luxembourg was in the German Customs Union before the war, so that Union had nearly 36,000,000 tons of ore at command, and it imported another 14,000,000, largely from French Lorraine. The reduction of German supplies to 7,500,000 tons creates a problem most vividly realised when one thinks of the vast metallurgical industries of the Ruhr and of the energy and thought lavishly spent on their development. The frontier determined in 1871 evidently had some military value that made the Germans, in 1914, choose rather the fatal way through Belgium, but it ran most inconveniently through what became the Minette Field. The new frontier is unsatisfactory, on the other hand, as regards coal, and an experiment is to be tried in the Saar basin (see p. 29). The circumstances cry out for co-operation between France and Germany in the matter of coal and iron, but it is to be feared that our political system will greatly hinder this, and thus harm us all.

THE RHINE.

The Rhine has long been navigable up to Mannheim and has been improved up to the twin-ports of Strasbourg on the Ill and Kehl on the Rhine close by, one on each side of the great river. Further improvements could extend navigation up to Basle, or, alternatively, that section of the river might be used more largely for water-power. These two aims inevitably conflict, and the mention of Basle is a reminder of Switzerland's interest which the French Government has not been inclined to appreciate. The control of Rhine navigation has been made international, though Germany's share will need to be increased quite soon on grounds of simple justice.

The new Rhine Commission includes five French representatives out of 19 members and provides that she shall name one of the five as President. The German riparians (dwellers on the banks) are to have four representatives and there are to be two each from Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Italy. The Commission is bound by the Treaty to give various powers to France and it provides for complete defortification of the Rhine and of a zone 50 kilometres wide on the right bank. There is to be no preference for vessels of any nationality on the Rhine. It should be noted, in passing, that the previous phase of French influence on the Rhine (in Napoleonic times) effected a great simplification of dues and administration. Like the Rhine, the Danube has long had an international commission and now the Elbe, Oder, and Niemen have also been internationalized, largely to help Czechoslovakia and Lithuania. This involves a far-reaching interference in the life of Prussia, and while one applauds every move towards co-operation between nations, one fears that we have here a case of application to the vanquished of principles the victors would not wish to apply to themselves. There are many such in the Treaty and they are the likeliest germs of future war. It is but fair to add, however, that the Treaty recognizing Poland suggests the internationalisation of the Vistula, and the Maritsa, may be internationalised.

The port of Kehl, which Germany was developing before the war on the right bank opposite Strasbourg, is to be administered with Strasbourg for six and possibly for nine years under a French manager appointed by the Commission, and resident in Strasbourg, its headquarters. The Rhine bridges on the Alsatian frontier now become French property. The new control of the Rhine and of the Saar basin (p. 29) as well as of Kehl will become tests of the possibilities of internationalisation, much as one must regret the atmosphere of bitterness in which, inevitably, the experiment is being tried. The experiment may be extended, if it is found desirable, to the

Moselle as well as to the Rhine above Basle, and Germany is bound to raise no objection.

ALSACE. (*Figs. 2 and 3.*)

Alsace is the basin of the Ill, on the Rhine's left bank, a plain beneath the steep faulted sides of the Vosges which form its western wall and contribute to give it a dry climate with a warm summer. As the name is now used, it includes Mulhouse, which voted itself French in 1798, but excludes Belfort, which France redeemed at great price in 1871. Belfort is closely related to the ancient Comté de Montbéliard, thoroughly French in spite of interesting old links with South Germany. History traces the growth of French power over Alsace in the 17th and 18th centuries and economic development linked the region with France. The Revolution (1789) won enthusiastic support in most parts of Alsace and few reasonable persons doubt the wrongness of the seizure of Alsace in 1871 by Germany. Even German organization and immigration had failed to alter the feeling of the country by 1914.

Of the few ways through the Vosges-Jura-Alps line that of Toul-Nancy-Zabern-Strasbourg, around the north end of the Vosges, is crucially important because of the Rhine crossing at Strasbourg, and has become most important also through the development of trans-continental express railways as it is low enough for the Marne-Rhine canal. Nodes of communication often develop machine industries and these have grown at Strasbourg and Mulhouse, while the latter is a textile town famed for cotton-printing. Just north of Mulhouse potash deposits have been opened up in the 20th century and their products are valuable both in industry and as fertilisers for surrounding lands. The soil of Alsace and especially the "loess" in the north beneath the Vosges is famed as a food producer, and the contrast between Alsace and Lorraine lies in the greater abundance of Alsatian vines, hops, fruits, and sugar. It is a good wheat-land, but rye has spread with German immigrant

labour, and it is in the hands of small proprietors to a large extent, especially in the vineyard country.

Long ago Henri Quatre (*ca.* 1600) suggested the inclusion of Alsace in an independent Switzerland and there are many analogies between Alsace and Swiss cantons, but such an addition would change the character of Switzerland in a Europe prone to war. Annexation to France seems the just and proper arrangement, but it is not a simple matter.

In Alsace, German speech necessitates special arrangements in the schools. Between 1871-1914 Germany gave a great deal of thought to the development of Strasbourg University and the city's life profited by the æsthetic efforts so widespread in that country. Moreover, German rule has developed systems of local government which cannot be set aside at will, and, most of all, it might be impolitic to try to separate church and state in Alsace as they have been separated of late years in France. On these grounds French thinkers are feeling their way towards partial decentralization and some of the apostles of militarism and war are now strongly in favour of this. The decentralization of France can convert her into an organization around which more and more regions might gather and so there is just a possibility here of a dawn of a better Europe.

LORRAINE. (*Figs. 2 and 3.*)

Lorraine is roughly the upper basin of the Moselle and its heart is the riverine region from the junction of the Meurthe down to the boundary of Luxembourg. The base of the limestone scarps (*Côtes-de-Moselle*) gives abundant springs and the meeting of limestones and clays brings fertility. The position of Metz commanding the way through the *côtes* into the Paris Basin is an outstanding fact. The country east of the scarps has less relief and there are numerous *étangs* (*meres*) in the clay-and-salt region, and on the clay plain of the *Wœvre* between the *côtes*. Farther east and south-east towards the *Vosges* is much forest (*Basses Vosges*).




Fig. 3. WATERWAYS AND INDUSTRY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE.

NOTE:—Since the above map was made some spellings have been fixed as follows:—
Basle, Mulhouse, Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Trier (for Treves), the others as above.

The winter is hard and dry, as is natural on a fairly high inland plateau and the spring is dry, too : indeed, Lorraine could be described until recently as a region of considerable difficulty, of struggle against poor soil save in the garden country near the Moselle. Added to this were difficulties connected with the great forests and the frequent recurrence of war. Much of the land is too wet and too heavy to plough easily and all these considerations have limited the development of small property and associated intensive use of the soil, have kept building and accessories on a lower level than in Alsace and have helped to maintain old systems of payment in kind which prove costly in the end.

The contrasts between Lorraine and Alsace were more marked than their similarities until they were forced to suffer together in 1871 because both had through ways to France. Of the two, Lorraine was the more intensely French and only a part of it was seized. Nancy and its region remained under the republic. After 1871 the development of iron mining, due to the British inventions already mentioned (p. 22), but naturally encouraged by German organization, began to change the world position of Lorraine. Prior to this, trade had been secondary, however interesting the early history of the salt trade may be. From 1880 onwards, Germans immigrated into the then German Lorraine and Italian, Belgian, and Luxembourg workmen settled on the French side, for France herself was short of man-power, or, one might say, did not produce the machine-fodder of countries with the higher birthrate. Statistics already given (p. 22) show the immense importance of the iron trade, but Lorraine has grave difficulties in the matter of coal.

The Saar coal is adapted rather for domestic fuel than for industry, so supplies have been coming from the Ruhr coalfield even though Lorraine has sent most of its iron away as pig-iron either to the Ruhr or to Belgium. The Saar field produced 13,000,000 tons of coal in 1913 and the rest of Lorraine (largely at Pont-à-Mousson) and Alsace another 5,000,000. Some of this went to Switzer-

and, which will still need this import ; much of the emainder will be used in Lorraine, and France will ontinue to need her old import of 22,000,000 tons and an additional quantity in place of what she used to get from her northern coalfield, which cannot do much for some years. The necessary importation of coal will be still further increased by the fact that France now has nearly all the Minette to work up. Metallurgical industries in Lorraine would be a great advantage, but their equipment and organisation are likely to require from ten to twenty years.

What seems so desirable for the world as a whole is the co-operative development of Lorraine, the Ruhr, and the Belgian industrial zone, all in conjunction with both the French ports and that of Antwerp, and this means the weakening of economic frontiers.

SAAR BASIN. (*Figs. 2 and 3.*)

The coal of the Saar basin seemed indicated as the best compensation France could have for the devastation of her northern coalfield. The Saar field stretched across the proposed frontier (an old one restored), and its people are mainly German.

The solution found for this problem has been that the coal area beyond the new French border is ceded to the League of Nations, and the mines in it are ceded to France as her full property, so that German ex-owners will have to seek compensation for their loss from Germany. The League is to appoint a governing commission of five, one a citizen of France, one a citizen of the Saar who is not French, and three belonging to countries other than France or Germany.

The chairman, who will be the Executive Officer, will be chosen from among these five by the Council of the League of Nations. The basin is to be in the French Customs Union, it must not be fortified, nor must its people be liable for military service. Its language, religion and local government are to be maintained

After 15 years the Saar is to have a plebiscite to decide whether it wishes to remain as it is, or to join France or to join Germany, and the Council of the League of Nations is to conduct the plebiscite and carry out its decisions. If the Saar wishes to return to Germany, that country will have to buy back the coal mines and to allow France rights of purchase of coal. Every arrangement which could have been suggested would be open to criticism, but this one is at least better than the violent annexation of 1871, and the measure of justice is greater than Mr. J. M. Keynes has allowed. Nevertheless, the governing commission will need to work with both genius and sympathy if the Saar is not to become a source of danger to the peace of Europe.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON ALSACE, LORRAINE, AND THE SAAR.

Germany must not discriminate against ex-enemies by export duties, nor must she enforce import dues against anything from Alsace and ex-German Lorraine. This clause holds for five years, and the French Government decides what shall be looked upon as coming from these regions. The ceded territories must have the benefit of free export from Germany of yarns and textiles sent there for any stage of their manufacture.

It is to be hoped that Lorraine pig-iron may still go to the Ruhr,* and that France may progress in the steel industry, though the difficulties are great, and it is the general custom to take the metal to the coal rather than vice versa. The old dominance of the Ruhr in European life was a danger, but its ruin through complete loss of iron from Lorraine would be a far graver one.

* Macfarlane (Brit. Assoc. Sci. Sect. E., 1920) suggests a clause like that to which Poland has agreed. For a period of 15 years Poland will permit the produce of the mines of Upper Silesia to be available for sale to purchasers in Germany on terms as favourable as are applicable to like products sold under similar conditions in Poland or in any other country. This arrangement was to come into effect if Poland had Upper Silesia awarded to her.

THE GERMAN PORTIONS ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE.

Only a brief note can be inserted here. The whole of this region was delivered by the French Revolution from many servitudes, and it gained an impetus to small proprietorship and intensive cultivation. A few details have already been given (p. 20-23), and here one need but add that its basic German character has been reinforced by industrial development and Germany's applied science. A great area became Rhenish Prussia in 1815, and a good deal of the right bank from Coblenz-Ems downwards is included in that province which thence possessed 10 towns with 100,000 to 500,000 (Cologne) people each in 1914. Even if this great population declines to some extent, it needs outside supplies of food, and Alsace might play a part here with advantage. The Ruhr needsorraine iron; and France, as well as the rest of the world, needs Ruhr products. Its present danger, with raw materials and transit arrangements highly precarious, and the economic situation under Reparation schemes most gloomy, is an important factor in the low rate of exchange, and that German exchange rate is an index figure of a heavy drag on the life of western Europe, and indeed, of the world.

LUXEMBOURG.

Luxembourg has had no change of frontiers, but its curious position in European affairs has been changed once more. From the early fifteenth century onwards the grand duchy had been associated with the Low Countries. From 1815 to 1836 it was ruled by the King of Holland, but was a state of the German Confederation, so that its ruler might claim German support against French aggression. Holland feared that Wallony might help French aggression, and claimed Luxembourg as a safeguard. The Grand Duchy joined the German Customs Union in 1845; the territory was neutral 1867-1914. The recent treaties offered Luxembourg the choice of entry into either the French or the Belgian

Customs Union. She voted for France, but in the end France declined to receive her, and she is thus thrown back upon her old relations with Belgium, though her bourgeoisie fear the socialistic tendencies so prevalent among most parties in Wallony. The iron ore of Luxembourg (p. 22) must not be over-rated, as the supplies may not last more than another 40 years. For the moment, however, they are important enough.

BELGIUM.—*I. The Eastern Frontier. (Fig. 4.)*

Before 1914 Germany was able to look down hill into Belgium and she built a military railway for aggressive purposes and organized a great camp at Elsenborn, near Malmédy. As a result of victory, therefore, it is but natural that the Belgian frontier has been strengthened strategically and two unit-districts of local government, named from the towns of Eupen and Malmédy have been given to Belgium.

Moresnet, once a zinc mine and long neutral territory between Belgium and Germany, goes to Belgium with the Eupen district. There is some criticism here as the Eupen district has many links with the great junction of Aachen and has sent it food. There cannot be the same doubt about Malmédy, a French-speaking town which was being forcibly Germanised. Belgium's gains rightly include forests which will be some compensation for timber destruction in the war. Both at Eupen and at Malmédy the orographical relations of the new frontier are much more favourable to Belgium, and she now owns parts of the erstwhile strategic railway and is stationed above most of the remainder, while the camp at Elsenborn also falls to her. It has been pointed out by one or two writers that the transfer of entire local government units was a wise step.

As Belgium *per se* is one of Europe's grave international problems, as well as one of the regions intermediate between the Paris Basin and the Rhine, it seems desirable to include here a short reference to it under its two chief parts, Wallony and Flanders. They together made up




Fig. 4. THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF BELGIUM.

NOTE: Since the above map was made the spelling of certain words has been fixed as follows:—Cologne, the others as above.

the kingdom of Belgium created in 1830 ; but they, and Luxembourg, have been drawn together politically since the 14th century.

BELGIUM.—II. *Wallony.*

The essential Wallony has already been described (p. 21) and its extension over the erstwhile forests of Hainaut and Brabant indicated. The discovery of coal along the Sambre-Meuse made the Belgian industrial-metallurgical district Walloon. The coal is continued over the French border to Lens and the Pas de Calais. Belgian coal is in thin, contorted seams and so is costly to work, but, in spite of low profits, a great steel industry has been built up with imports of Minette (and pig-iron from Minette) as well as of ore from Spain and Norway. Industry founded on local supplies has thus, as in Britain, developed further by using imported materials.

The Walloons are physically of the race of the Alpine broadheads, noted for their frugal tenacity and their attachment to the soil so often gained by clearing of the forest or redemption of the waste. The industrial population thus remains much more rural than in Britain, and a customs tariff has made stock-raising profitable. It has been half-humorously said that a leading character of the Alpine Race is a love of committees, and co-operative tendencies are highly developed in Wallony. The Labour Party covers the worker with its schemes all through his life, and its old antagonist, the Clerical Party, has had to follow suit. As gardening provided a good deal of food, wages were not forced up for a long time and the high costs of coal-mining further kept them down. But industrialism has brought the usual struggle for higher standards of expenditure among the factory workers, and Wallony, once a backward rural country, has become industrially rich and politically versed in all the extreme ideas current in manufacturing and mining areas. It has come into increased touch with French life and its capital, Brussels, has grown into almost a second Paris.

BELGIUM.—III. *Flanders.*

Flanders is allied to Holland in language, but there is much divergence between the two. Holland, beyond the Maas, was not seriously Romanised. From movements towards toleration in the Middle Ages, she went on to revolt against the Church, and her delta-islands, homes of the famed Sea Beggars, turned her thoughts to sea trade and adventure in competition with Catholic Spain and Portugal; her struggle with the sea on her coasts is famed in all history. Flanders has struggled less with the sea, her position at the gates of France drew her early into European conflicts, and, being between England and the Rhine, her markets (of Ypres, Bruges and Ghent) and textile industries grew famous centuries ago. She was on the Roman side of Rhine and Maas and expulsion of Protestants gave the Counter-Reformation an immense influence in the late 16th and the 17th centuries. Wool weaving and linen weaving are old-established industries and the water of the Lys at Courtrai is specially good for retting flax fibres. Ghent was of old a sturdy centre of municipal independence with a long continuity of greatness, and the Terneuzen canal (see p. 36) has made it an important port and so redeemed the difficulty created when Bruges and Damme decayed. It leads in cotton, linen, hemp and jute industries, but most of these are also found in other parts even as far as Hainaut and Brabant. Hosiery and lace, as often happens, have another centre, Tournai, while the quality of the Vesdre water makes Verviers an important wool centre, the one great textile town that is in the original Wallony. A consideration of Antwerp is postponed to the next section.

On the whole Flanders is thus a region with old-established textile industries worked by an energetic peasantry which has remained Catholic, but, in its isolation from other Low German lands, it has not developed a strong literary language, the decline of Ghent in the 16th century being a further hindrance in this matter. It is much more conservatively and

clerically inclined than modern Wallony, and the difference of language makes it increasingly difficult, in view of present tendencies towards nation-states on a language basis, for the two to work together. Fear of German influence has led the Walloon-French element in Belgium to deal harshly with Flemish aspirations since the end of the war, and the problem of the unity of Belgium is a serious one, though the two regions supplement one another so admirably in an economic sense, and would seem to have the most manifest interest in co-operation on a footing of equality. Unfortunately the French-speaking Belgian politicians and officials are not ready to learn Flemish as a second language, and so equality remains but a pious wish.

BELGIUM.—IV. *Antwerp and the Scheldt.*

With the decline of Bruges, Antwerp grew up and soon had to face Dutch rivalry. While Bourbon France seemed bent on aggression, Protestant powers like Britain and Prussia favoured Dutch control of the lower Scheldt, whereby, in the 17th century, the trade of Antwerp was nearly ruined. With the French Revolution the river was reopened but in the end (1839) an unsatisfactory compromise was reached. It left Holland in possession of 275 square miles on the south side of the lower Scheldt and made her consent a necessary preliminary to river improvements, also placing navigation and pilotage under joint control of Holland and Belgium. Navigation of the Scheldt is of hardly any interest to Holland save from the point of view of her security against attack. It is on the other hand vital to Antwerp, the rival of Rotterdam. To press her legitimate rivalry, Antwerp is ready to spend money on the Scheldt, but Belgium has to secure Holland's consent each time; it has usually been given. The obvious difficulty has increased since the building of the Terneuzen Canal (1827, enlarged 1913) from Ghent to the Scheldt. It crosses the Dutch territory south of the Scheldt and the Dutch portion is narrower at the

surface than the Belgian portion, though not for reasons of ill-will. The commerce of Antwerp and Ghent thus has serious difficulties to face. Before the war Antwerp had made great strides in spite of her difficulties, the great river entry, the immense quay space, the development of the new Campine coalfield behind the city, her wonderful position as an exit for Ruhr products as well as for those of Walloon industry, all combined to make that port one of the very first rank, with great prospects, and inevitably with strong German connections. The future of Antwerp is thus a matter of universal concern and the situation is further complicated by Belgium's tragic experience of German bad faith. Her neutrality was only a scrap of paper; she dare not trust it again. But if she must arm herself Antwerp should be her great military base, and yet the Dutch are required to prevent warships and supplies from coming up the lower Scheldt. At present France is not disposed to develop Lorraine's trade relations with Antwerp; she wishes them to be with French ports, but it is questionable whether this is really in the interests of Lorraine.

BELGIUM.—V. *Further Notes.*

Belgium is also troubled about the Maas or lower Meuse where the Dutch hold the Limburg strip of territory, though they were not strong enough to prevent the retreating German army from marching through it with their booty at the end of the war. The historic citadel of Maastricht gives the strip links with Dutch sentiment, but, if it cannot be defended, it becomes an international problem of great importance: a Dutch officer has recently urged that defence is out of the question.

Before the war, Belgium imported raw material for Germany and North France as well as for herself. She also imported large quantities of foodstuffs and exported the manufactures of the great countries beyond her borders as well as from her own industries. In 1912

the exports amounted to 255 millions and the imports to 296 millions sterling, about 100 millions out of these large sums in each case standing for goods in transit. On these Belgium earned a fair amount for transshipment and transport. The growth since the beginning of the 20th century had been rather more than 100 per cent. and there can be little doubt that German observation of this development had not a little to do with the policy of violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 and of later encouragement of Flemish separatism.

The case of Belgium with its divergent Walloon and Flemish halves, with its problems of military defence and of commercial freedom, is one which undoubtedly needs very careful and sympathetic consideration by all the nations. The country was less wasted by war than France, its internal organisation and the habits of the people led it to strive to reorganise itself at once, and its recovery is one of the most remarkable of post-war facts. But this recovery makes the problems here raised all the more urgent. One need not enlarge upon the greatness of that difficulty so long as the idea of the state involves emphasis on frontiers to the extent that it does at present.

CHAPTER III.

SLESVIG, AND THE PORTS AND RIVERS OF THE GERMAN PLAIN.

SLESVIG. (*Fig. 5.*)

BETWEEN the boundary of the Roman Empire and that of the Roman Church, both in time and, broadly, in place, stands another which has also been a subject of modern nationalist dispute.

Holstein was Christianised before the days of Charlemagne (*ca.* 770), and was included in the Empire from the early years of the ninth century. Slesvig was Christianised later, and remained outside the Empire. Holstein was included in the German Confederation from 1815, and gave her ruler, the King of Denmark, a seat in the Diet. Both duchies were forcibly annexed by Germany after the war of 1864. Before that time, there had been Danish attempts to suppress German elements. After that date Prussia made much more embittered attempts in the opposite direction.

The general tendency was, recently, towards recession of the Danish language northwards and the Frisian language westwards, but how much of this was natural and how much due to political pressure it is difficult to estimate.

In treaty discussions it was rightly taken for granted that Holstein would be German, but Slesvig was divided into zones for plebiscites. Though some of its communes are mainly German, on the whole Northern Slesvig, being Danish-speaking, has voted for Denmark as everyone expected. The rest of Slesvig elects to remain German. The treaty adjusts the boundary of N. Slesvig northwest of the town of Flensburg (65,000 population), and it runs westnorthwestwards south of Tondern to the sea on the north side of Sylt. Now Flensburg market and port on the south side of the head of its fjord cannot well be cut away from its surroundings on the north, as they contribute much to its business; it is, moreover,

important to them. Fortunately, the Danish State, since the country's agricultural and co-operative re-education after 1864, has developed a character which should ease the situation. A valuable fishing ground south of Alsen is allocated to Denmark.


It has been evident throughout the discussion that Denmark is no longer concerned to champion the indivisibility of the duchies, or even of Slesvig, and that she is anxious to avoid approaching the Kiel Canal, which must be involved in naval and international politics of a kind for which she has no taste.

PORTS AND RIVERS OF THE GERMAN PLAIN.

The treaty provides that the nationals of any of the allied and associated powers, as well as their vessels and their property, shall enjoy in all German ports and on the inland navigation routes of Germany the same treatment in all respects as German nationals, vessels, and property. It also stipulates that the free zones in German ports existing on August 1, 1914, shall be maintained as of old, and that Czechoslovakia shall have free zones at Hamburg and Stettin, while the vessels of commerce of all nations at peace with Germany shall receive equal treatment for equal dues in the Kiel Canal.

The following portions of rivers are further declared international :—

1. The Elbe from its confluence with the Ultava (Moldau) and the Ultava from Prague. This is to be managed by a Commission comprising four representatives of German states bordering on the river, two of Czechoslovakia, and one each of Britain, France, Italy and Belgium.
2. The Oder from its confluence with the Oppa (near the border of Czechoslovakia) (Fig. 9). This is to be managed by a commission comprising one representative of Poland, three representatives of Prussia, one of Czechoslovakia, and one each of Britain, France, Denmark and Sweden.
3. The Niemen down from Grodno to be managed by an International Commission to be specified later.



! Fig. 5. CHANGES IN SLESVIG.

The arrangements for the Elbe and Oder give Czechoslovakia protection of ways to the open sea which are bound to be of the utmost importance to it. Analogous arrangements for the Danube (p. 64) give it like help on the other side. The scheme for the Oder will also be of great use to Upper Silesia if that region votes for Poland. The scheme for the Niemen is as yet undetermined and the region of the Niemen mouth and Memel is suffering from the unsettled state of affairs in Lithuania, which apparently hinders the Supreme Council of the Allies from reaching a decision. It seems a matter that might be entrusted to the League of Nations, but apparently nothing has as yet been done. If these arrangements for the ordering of rivers are a prelude to widespread international co-operation in the control of inland waterways they must surely be welcomed, but one wonders whether we should have been willing to apply similar principles to rivers of which we owned the lower sections had there been such cases. The Vistula is to be internationalized according to the Treaty creating the Polish state, and the Maritza on request of any riparian state, if the Turkish Treaty is confirmed. The Commissions appointed will control navigation and river improvement, including the construction of canals for the benefit of shipping, and there are to be no discriminative dues or, indeed, any at all save those provided by the agreement founding the Commission. Such dues are to cover the cost of maintenance and a schedule of them is to be posted up in each port concerned.

CHAPTER IV.

THE EASTERN BORDER OF EUROPE-OF-THE-SEA.

It has already been pointed out that, towards the eastern border of ecclesiastical Roman influence, the nation-state has not attained such characteristic expression as further west. On the eastern border of the fully Germanised part of the European plain is territory with a Slav-speaking peasantry and often German-speaking lords and the Baltic-German aristocracy has been very powerful in the S.E. Baltic coast-lands. Further east there is a gradation to population of peasants speaking Lithuanian or Ruthenian with a Polish or Polonised aristocracy. This widespread divergence of language and often of religion between noble and simple has been one hindrance to the growth of a native middle-class. In Poland this hindrance has been accentuated by defensive wars which, as in Spain and elsewhere, have done a good deal to keep the population stratified into leaders and common soldiers. Everywhere towards this border therefore there has been a tendency in recent generations to develop an immigrant middle class of German or Jewish origin often maintaining its own traditions. Again, towards this border, the clearing of the great forests is more recent than farther west and in many parts large tree-covered areas still remain. Accompanying this state of affairs we find the peasantry often absorbed in local affairs, agitated about the possession and utilisation of the soil, inexperienced in national politics and, in many cases, feverishly resentful of the alien traders or the, it may be, semi-alien aristocracy. We thus seem to be in a region going through the fermentation which might precede development of national consciousness, if evolution proceeded as it has done in the west. A general result of war-changes thus far has been to weaken the aristocracies and trading elements

and to leave the peasants, with their better food supplies, rather less reduced than the other classes, though also much impoverished for want of seeds, implements, markets, etc., as well as by devastations. One result of this may be that more of the food it is hoped they will grow, if the situation clears, will be used for themselves. The industrial west must therefore not expect to get from them all it did when they worked for the profit of landlords anxious to trade. Another aspect of the matter is that there must remain considerable doubt about the efficiency of the agriculture carried on by a peasantry which has had so few chances hitherto. It is quite possible that the crops will be poor for a long time and it is almost certain that confidence and commercial organization will take years to develop. The outlook, therefore, if interesting from many points of view, is nevertheless unpromising, and it has not been improved by the tendency of our western statesmen not to think beyond the creation of sovereign-states on more or less western lines.

FINLAND.—(*Fig. 6.*)

Finland is a plateau of ancient rocks covered in many parts by the debris of vanished glaciers forming moraines that interfere with the drainage and give rise to thousands of lakes. The lake plateau is separated from the sea by a coastal plain covered with moraines drained by rivers, the northern plateau is somewhat higher and far rougher, but there are no great heights in Finland. The northern plateau is under snow and ice from October to May, and most of the lakes are frozen over by All Souls' Day. The coast is ice-bound from January till April, but Åbo and Helsingfors can be kept open however much they are troubled by drift ice. These facts give Finland some ground for an interest in the fate of the Åland Islands, the harbour of which, at Mariehamn, is usually open throughout the year.

The northern and the lake plateaux are cold and remain wet even when the snow melts, and their tree covering is




Fig. 6. FINLAND.

mainly pine and birch. The southwest coastal strip has the oak, is able to grow wheat, and has better chances of sea trade. Åbo and Helsingfors, on this southwest strip, are cities of western character, far more in touch with the general life of the Baltic than with Russia. The people of Finland may best be called Finlanders, as the term Finn is used in a somewhat wider sense, which it will be well to indicate. Arctic Europe has peoples who are really of Asiatic origin, with the broad heads, big cheekbones and flat faces we associate with the great interior of Eastern Asia. There are indications of their one time penetration southward along the eastern shores of the Baltic, probably right down into the German plain. The Baltic lands, on the other hand, have long been a great home of the tall, blond, blue-eyed, rather long-headed men whom anthropologists call the Nordic Race. In Finland it would appear that the two elements have mingled. Some of the Finlanders of the south-west strip, and at a few other points on the coast, may be almost pure Nords, but often show traces of the other strain of inheritance. The Finlanders, with somewhat more of the Asiatic character, living chiefly inland, are often called Tavastlandian Finns. In the region of the great lakes, Ladoga and Onega, that is in Karelia, the same complex is still further mixed, this time with Russian peoples, and the mixed stock is described as Karelian Finn. It is interesting that in Finland, as in many other lands where he has been a coastal immigrant, the Nordic type has acquired a native language, apparently through intermarriage. The Arctic-Asiatic element was strong enough also on the south side of the Gulf of Finland to make its language, there developed into Esth, the current one. Farther south, this old element has not kept its language, and, indeed, it is usually quite submerged. It is with one of the most recent impacts of Baltic blond against Finns and Finlanders that the records of Finland open. A crusade from Sweden in the twelfth century conquered the souls and, doubtless, some of the lands, of the heathen of Finland. The country, therefore,

belongs to the region influenced by ecclesiastical Rome, while Russia, beyond its borders, is Orthodox. We thus have another indication of Finland's links with the Baltic and the west, rather than with the Russian plain. The political story of Finland brings out the fact that, like the other Baltic lands, it seceded from the Roman Church at the great schism of the sixteenth century, and, like them, became Protestant, with a nineteenth century development analogous to that of British Nonconformity among its industrial bourgeoisie. Following the growth of Muscovy into Russia, there came a gradual transfer of influence from Sweden to Russia, but this occurred after Finnish institutions had taken shape. In the nineteenth century autocratic Russia tried to work in double harness with the semi-constitutional State of Finland, but was baulked by developments which could not but spread from the rest of Europe to Helsingfors. There was, first of all, the literary revival of Finnish, which, it was claimed, brought out the richness of Finnish speech. Secondly, the extension of the franchise led to the opening of opportunities of public service for women, and this came earlier in Finland than in most other countries. Thirdly, an important economic change occurred. The struggle with climate and poor soil had been a very hard one, and both peasantry and aristocracy were poor, while in this region the nobles had little opportunity to maintain a European position by war and diplomacy. Opportunities for commerce were therefore seized, and in the nineteenth century the Finnish nobility followed the older example of the Norwegian and merged itself into the trading classes, losing hereditary privileges, but becoming comparatively rich and powerful. Agriculture was relatively weakened with the growth of trade, but the small amount of good land made it a precious possession and the Finlanders are keenly interested in peasant proprietorship. The reassertion of the language, the extension of the franchise, the disappearance of the nobility and the strength of individual ownership of land all helped to differentiate Finland more and more from

Russia. The proportion of rural to urban population in Finland is estimated at 6 : 1.

In the 20th century, with its awful increase of militarism foreshadowing the war of 1914-18, administrative difficulties led to Tsarist oppression and Finland became separatist. Even the Kerensky and the Lenin governments found difficulties with Finland's western ideas, so the Russian Revolution did not ease the situation. In fact the power of aristocratic commercialism made the situation more acute; the "White Guard" became very powerful in Finland. In the war, Finland found she could sell lumber, leather, and other products at big profits and her people left the ungrateful soil to take up industry on a larger scale at a time when Marxist doctrines were spreading far and wide. Finland has thus developed a Social Democracy, but has found food supply a difficult problem made more troublesome by disorganization of transport and credit, though her currency is not nearly so debased as are those of Germany and of some of the states developed out of Austria-Hungary. A return to cultivation is likely, but, with peace assured, Finland would become more commercial and industrial, though her water power is frozen up in winter. It is said that she has kept her good cattle with a view to sending butter out through Denmark as of old and she is now considering a train ferry to Sweden with double-gauge lines (4ft. 8½in. and 5ft.) in both countries. This, with a duty-free transshipment area, perhaps at Åbo, might give Finland a good deal of trade and make her an outlet for goods from North Russia.

On December 8, 1920, English newspapers published a treaty concluded between Finland and Russia on October 14, which may be summarised here, and it should be stated in fairness to both parties that the treaty is one of mutual accommodation. It recognises Finland as a sovereign state and describes, very nearly, the old frontiers but adds that Russia cedes to Finland the territory of Petschenga along with the coast and territorial waters belonging to it for all time in full

sovereignty. Finland, however, undertakes not to establish naval bases in the Arctic Ocean, nor to maintain in those waters armed vessels with a displacement of more than 400 tons each. It also undertakes to allow free transit through Petschenga to men and goods between Russia and Norway: this last provision may have some importance for the Lapps, whose wanderings were a source of trouble between Sweden and Norway some time ago. Finland withdraws from two communes on its eastern border and these are to be a part of Eastern Karelia, which is to have a government on the basis of national self-determination. The two governments agree to demilitarise the frontier near Ladoga, and to urge upon Europe together the neutralization of the Gulf of Finland and, if possible, of the whole Baltic. If they succeed they agree that Ladoga shall also be neutral; they further make a start by neutralising islands in the Gulf of Finland. Russia will allow Finland's merchantmen on the Neva between Ladoga and the sea on the same terms as her own and the financial and commercial clauses are worked out in the same spirit, while a joint authority is set up to work out any difficulty in the treaty. At the recent meeting of the League of Nations Assembly Finland was admitted as a member of the League and it is hoped that the new State is making a good start on sound lines in spite of the awful difficulties just across its border at Petrograd.

THE ÅLAND ISLANDS.

A portion of the Finnish plateau overwhelmed by the sea stretches out to the south-west into the Baltic with reefs breaking the surface of the sea and making navigation difficult. The outstanding parts of this plateau are the Åland Islands and they are separated on the west from Sweden by a deeper clear channel across which navigation is easy. The islands are thus structurally an extension of Finland and vitally important to her if military considerations have to be borne in mind; they also tempt her commercially because Mariehamn is an open

harbour in an average winter, but the economic links are more largely with Sweden than with Finland. Concerning the people, it would be possible to argue in more than one way, and it is wisest merely to argue that the difference between the people of the Swedish coast near Stockholm and those of the South-West Finland coast should not be exaggerated. Both countries have agreed to submit the matter of the Åland Islands to the League of Nations, and it is very greatly to be hoped that the League may be successful in taking up the Russo-Finnish scheme for neutralising the Baltic.* A reduction of tension in Western Europe would help Germany to agree to this and so we see how questions are linked to one another in a fateful way. Scandinavia set a fine example some years ago (1906) by keeping the frontier between Sweden and Norway demilitarised and the spread of this idea to other frontiers round the Baltic and to the Baltic itself would be most valuable in promoting much-needed experiments of the same kind elsewhere in Europe.

ESTHONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA (*Fig. 7*).

The S.E. Baltic Coast lands have had an Arctic Asiatic element in their population in the far past and this has remained sufficiently strong to fix the language of the peasantry in the northern part which is becoming Esthonia. Farther south that element has been submerged but there are various ancient language groups the chief of which are Lettish (Latvia) and Lithuanian, both allied to the family of European languages. Over them for some centuries a Nordic, German aristocracy has maintained itself, chiefly in Esthonia and Latvia, while a native but more or less Polonised nobility is a feature in Lithuania. Esthonia and Latvia have now been recognised as states by the Supreme Council of the allies but the fate of Lithuania is still unsettled.

ESTHONIA.

The new state has made a treaty with Russia which recognises boundaries much like those of the 10th century

* See Addendum, p. 81.

but includes in Esthonia the textile town of Narva on the east side of the Narova River. The southern boundary goes beyond the old Russian province and is an approximation to the language boundary, as is usual under the recent treaties. A bleak and stormy climate makes its woodlands largely pines, which were exploited by the aristocracy. Its arable land is perhaps 10 per cent., for swamps and peat marshes occupy a large area, and the aristocracy used Dorpat their old university centre (1632) for agricultural effort. They had organised society on a manorial scheme, and the war has now brought the peasants into power over the land in their place. The bearing of this on future agriculture remains to be seen. Revel is a useful port for transit trade, a little more open in winter than the Latvian Hanseatic city of Riga, which is screened from mildening influences of the sea by the presumedly Esthonian islands of Osel and Dago. The Russian treaty appears to have made reasonable provision for Revel's commerce, which will doubtless be an important asset of the little new state.

LATVIA.

Esth is not much spoken in the Aa basin, and this, together with what were once South Livonia and Courland, are the main part of Latvia, a land somewhat less bleak and more dry, because more undulating than Esthonia. Though Latvia is practically without oak and beech, its forests are better than those of Esthonia and the crops on its arable land include some wheat in the south. As in Esthonia the peasantry has got hold of the land, with what results the future will show. Stock-raising and dairy-farming are important as they are in other lands within hail of Denmark, but commerce is likely to be the mainstay of Latvia. Riga had 500,000 people before the war and is an old Hanse town of varied trade and industry, while Libau and Windau are other ports. The growth of industries has brought peasants into the towns to form an unskilled proletariat which has suffered sadly of late. There are lines of

swamps in the boundary zone between Latvia and Russia and it seems likely that frontier questions will not be serious.

LITHUANIA.

Lithuania contrasts with the other two states above in many ways. It is primarily an inland region with long-persistent forests and may be described as a fringing land of Poland with a very different and far older but still "European" language. Her able sons have long found careers in Poland and her nobles have largely been Polonised. In association with Poland, she escaped to some extent the Teutonic Knights and the Baltic aristocracy of Latvia and Esthonia, and she remained Roman Catholic whereas they are called Protestant. Eastwards there is a gradation to Russia and Slavonic speech (Ruthenian in parts) as well as to Orthodoxy in religion, but statistics are difficult to analyse. The undoubted Lithuania is the old Russian government of Kovno and the north-western half of that of Vilna. Unfortunately for the country, Vilna city is largely Jewish and Polish and its economic position is a difficult one. The League of Nations has taken various steps to try to secure a plebiscite at Vilna and to police the district in the meantime. The plebiscite scheme has now been given up as impracticable. Unfortunately the partly Lithuanian-speaking territory formerly in East Prussia, north of the Niemen, and its more or less German industrial port, Memel, are not yet finally allocated, probably because of Lithuanian difficulties and uncertainties, though Germany has had to hand them over to the Allies for disposal. With Vilna and Memel both doubtful, Lithuania remains very weak and furnishes an excuse for Poland and Russia each to suspect that she is subservient to the other. Like the Baltic states, Lithuania has witnessed the conquest of the land by the peasantry who here, as there, prefer individual property and thus stand out against the more communistic Russian schemes. They are said to have

done quite well of late years, but agriculture is less important commercially than the trade in timber floated down the Niemen which, under the new arrangements, is to be under international control from Grodno to the sea.

POLAND. (*Figs. 7 and 8.*)

Anthropologists note evidence of the spread of a broad-headed population downhill from the mountain axis of Europe, where men of this type have apparently lived from early prehistoric times onwards. From the Tatra and Carpathians the spread on the outer side of the curve has radiated outwards over the plain to the Baltic shores east of the middle Elbe, to the Lithuanian forests, to the Pripet swamps, and on the southern side of these last into the forests of Russia (Muscovy) via the great Dnieper crossing at Kiev. The region of this spread is crossed by a belt of what has within human times been almost open (*i.e.*, non-forested) country, the belt of the "loess," and along that belt have occurred important movements of people, especially from the neighbourhood of Kiev westward, presumably under pressure of steppe peoples farther south.

Whatever their place of origin, a number of related forms of speech have come into existence in this region of radiation, and the family name of these languages is Slavonic. Czech, Wend, Polish, and Ruthenian and White Russian are names designating varieties in different parts. Wend and related languages have given way in the main to German spreading eastwards across Elbe and Oder (p. 57). Czech has re-asserted itself effectively in the nineteenth century, and Polish stubbornly maintains itself, and, being in closer contact with the west than Ruthenian and White Russian, has become a rather more complete instrument. There has thence long been a tendency for Polish civilisation to spread eastwards, for Lithuanian, White Russian and Ruthenian peasants to be under Polish magnates, as well as for Polish and allied forms of speech to give way before




Fig. 8.

German advancing through the aristocracy from the west. As already stated, Poland has long felt herself a frontier post of Western Europe, and her attachment to the Roman Church is a notable fact. The Ruthenian people have been the chief adherents of the Uniate Church (p. 10). Poland's frontier feeling has been much strengthened in history by her resistance to pressure from the Steppe on the south-east, and she certainly placed all Europe in her debt by saving her neighbours to her own undoing. As in Spain, thanks there to the Moorish struggle, only here more so because of the opportunities for spread of scions of her nobility (*szlachta*) into Ruthenian country (the Ukraine), the struggle kept her a people of nobles and peasantry during the centuries when the organising middle classes were springing up in the west. Her policy of toleration in the Middle Ages brought in Germans and Ashkenazim Jews to form a middle or trading class in her towns.

When, therefore, the earlier social phase of life in small communities in forest-clearings graded into the later phase of state organisation, Poland found herself weak because the nobles, middle class and peasantry, in any region, might frequently differ in language and religion, while they also differed in these ways from the members of their own group in other parts of the country. The power of the nobles (*szlachta*) has been the great hindrance to the growth of central organisation, but another acting by its side has been that of the counter-reformation, here, as everywhere, anti-national because of its keen allegiance to Rome. In her decline, Poland unfortunately gave up her policy of toleration, and there is much bitterness between the Churches and against the Jews. The Uniate Church was suppressed during the latter half of the nineteenth century by the Tsardom and forcible conversion of the people to nominal Orthodoxy was carried through. Poland's ancient centres of civilisation are Gniezno (Gnesen) and Cracow, both ecclesiastical links with the west. Both were partially superseded by Warsaw, a development of the later Middle Ages and

one of the great cities of civilisation, to which Poland has made magnificent contributions in the arts and sciences, in action and in thought. Her resurrection is one of the finest facts of our new-born Europe, her political problems one of its gravest dangers. Her critics will do well to remember that she has to face these problems with a more or less alien middle class and proletariat in the cities, and in the industrial areas around Lodz, as well as almost without administrative experience. Her frontiers are of a nature that invites adventure, the emptiness towards the east prompts colonisation to relieve the land problem, and her future, unless the League of Nations be made a reality, is very doubtful indeed.

The frontiers of Poland everywhere raise complex difficulties ; she is transitional in every direction.

THE POLISH FRONTIERS.—I. *The West.*

From the tenth century to the fourteenth there occurred an eastward extension of German from the Altmark, across Elbe and Oder, to the Mittelmark and Neumark accompanied by settlement of many villages, development of agriculture and conversion to the Roman Church. The conversion of Poland occurred in the eleventh century and religion and fixation of the rural agricultural population spread along the Vistula. When Germanisation reached the Neumark, therefore, it found the lower Vistula fixedly Slav. Danzig had grown up as a Hanse town and near it was Oliva Abbey, an advance post of Christianity. In response to an appeal from Oliva and Danzig, the Teutonic Knights took up the Christianisation of East Prussia beyond the Vistula and that region became German, at least along the coastal plain. In the maps of fifteenth century Germany, therefore, the new western boundary of Poland and the "Corridor" down to Danzig are clearly foreshadowed, the new arrangement is based on language and represents the position reached when agricultural settlement had attained the stage that made further language change difficult and slow. This may be defined roughly as the stage at which markets became as

important as fairs. The Corridor is thus a historico-geographical fact and must be recognised, but it is at the same time a most grave problem that may lead to the undoing of Poland unless the League of Nations gains very real power.

THE POLISH FRONTIERS.—II. *Danzig.*

Danzig has been made a State under a High Commissioner representing the European powers and a body of locally-elected representatives. The bounds of this State will be fixed by the High Commissioner with one German and one Polish helper. Poland is to have a free port at Danzig and to control all that is not purely local in the communications of Danzig, as well as that city's foreign relations. The situation is a trying one for all concerned, and one cannot but hope that Poland will seek to minimise hardships by easing in every way communications between East Prussia and the rest of Germany, as well as that the High Commissioner will contrive to make Danzig contented and prosperous and an instrument for promoting mutual understanding between Germans and Poles.

THE POLISH FRONTIERS.—III. *Poland and East Prussia.*

Germanisation has never been completed in the Masurian lake district behind the coastal plain of East Prussia, and the whole area of partially Polish speech was referred for plebiscite, to be followed by delimitation of frontiers. The plebiscite has favoured Germany, but the boundaries have not yet been settled; the settlement must be in favour of Germany.

THE POLISH FRONTIERS.—IV. *Poland and Lithuania.*

This matter has already been discussed under Lithuania (p. 53). Those Poles who think Vilna should be Polish argue for a Corridor right up to the Duna, making contact with Latvia and shutting Lithuania off from Russia.

It need hardly be added that these people would also like to see Lithuania in some degree controlled by Poland.

THE POLISH FRONTIERS.—V. *Upper Silesia.*

Upper Silesia has a Polish dialect, but has not been administratively in Poland since the first half of the Middle Ages. It has had relations with Bohemia and thus, later, with Austria, and later still with Prussia. The towns are German to a large extent, but the rural population east of the Oder is almost entirely Pole. The Germans are mainly Protestant, and the Poles Catholic, and from 1871, onwards, the new German Empire has tried "unionist" methods in this area with the ill success that always attends efforts at forcible denationalisation. The recent vote has given a German majority, but the Polish rural districts have voted for Poland, and whatever solution is adopted there is urgent need for protection of minorities by the League of Nations. If Poland should get Upper Silesia, a small region in the south is to go to Czechoslovakia.

THE POLISH FRONTIERS.—VI. *Děčín and Small Areas East of It.*

The district around the old town of D \acute{e} čín (Fig. 9) was claimed by both Czechoslovakia and Poland and, after several attempts at plebiscite, the matter was referred by both sides to the Supreme Council of the Allies. The Council awarded to Czechoslovakia the Karwin Coalfield and the North-West—South-East railway, with the territory to the west of it. Poland gets the largest part of the district, but the railway is vital to Czechoslovakia as it runs over the territory of that state both before it enters and after it leaves D \acute{e} čín, and at the south the railway runs through an important pass. The coalfield will more than double the coal production of Czechoslovakia, whereas, even without Upper Silesia, Poland has large reserves of this fuel. Czechoslovakia appears to have had awarded to her two small districts farther east, which were debateable ground.

THE POLISH FRONTIERS.—*VII. The East.*

The Pripet marshes are the frontier zone, but the emphasis on a linear boundary with our present political system involves many problems. The sparse population of the marshes speaks either Ruthenian or White Russian (on the north), but Poland is naturally afraid of having Bolshevism enthroned so near her and there have been several suggestions of frontier lines as well as of Polish colonization eastward. If Poland does get the corridor to the Duna (p. 58), with or without Vilna, she will try to control the one railway line southwards through the marshes via Baranovitchi to Rovno. The minimum frontier on the other hand would run N.-S. to the west of Brest-Litovsk and would be about the language frontier of Russian statisticians. The Russo-Polish treaty apparently gives Poland the better of these two frontiers.

THE POLISH FRONTIERS.—*VIII. The South-East: Poland and the Ukraine.*

The Ruthenian country centres on Kiev on the Dnieper and extends east and west, in the latter case south of the Pripet swamps as far as Przemyśl though the country round Lwow (Lemberg) is Polish and that city is one which cannot but interest Poland very keenly. The presence of Polish landowners controlling Ruthenian peasantry, the memory, at least, of the Uniate Church and its persistence in the formerly Austrian Poland (E. Galicia at any rate) make the relations arguable. The Ukraine (Border) is historically a region of defence and aggression against steppe-nomads and towards the steppe its people are organized as Cossacks with land tenure related to military service. The whole area is so indefinite that in spite of there being a population of 23,000,000 one can say nothing of its administration. It has serious difficulties about absorption by Communistic Russia because, on its good soil, capable of great agricultural developments, there are strong tendencies to

individual proprietorship. Here as elsewhere the last few years seem to have displaced the aristocracy and we are apparently living through a phase of agrarian change on the borders of Europe-of-the-Sea analogous in some ways to that of the 1789 Revolution in France. The large proportion of Jews in the population adds many complications here.




Fig. 9. DANUBIAN LANDS.

CHAPTER V.

DANUBIAN LANDS. (*Fig. 9.*)

THE grasslands of Asia stretch into Roumania and beyond the Iron Gates into true Hungary, giving place to forest at the sides of the Danube basin, and, westwards, towards Vienna. Vienna is thus the gate from grasslands to forest, from less settled to more settled, from Eastern to Germanic conditions. It is a city of a Mark or March, a frontier region.

On the other hand the characteristic languages of the hill frame are Slavonic or influenced by Slavonic. The religious relations are or have been with Rome or with Constantinople largely according to the relative facilities of communication with the one or the other. The result is that populations in this region have various combinations of inheritance and are by no means sharply divided geographically. The modern development of national consciousness has thus created many problems which are accentuated by the dominance of the idea of state-sovereignty in political thought. It has at any rate long been clear that the Danube must be international and the new arrangements are modelled on those in vogue before 1914 with the proviso that the river is to be international right up to Ulm, which should become a market for Danube trade on an increased scale. It is unfortunate, but almost inevitable, that the new states should be chary of starting commercial relations with one another, but there are signs of good sense in the matter. The Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia) is apparently at work, and Hungary is at least discussing matters with Czechoslovakia.

THE DANUBE.

There has long been an International Commission for the Danube. The Treaty makes some provision towards its reconstitution and directs that it shall have juris-

diction right up to Ulm and that on tributaries like the Morava (March) and Tisa (Thaya) the jurisdiction shall extend far enough to give states and regions a chance of exporting goods to the sea without change of bottoms. It provides that if the Rhine-Danube waterway recently discussed is constructed, that canal shall be under the same authority. There is to be no preferential treatment of vessels belonging to any nation. For the present, representatives of Britain, France, Italy, and Roumania are to form the Commission, but ultimately there are to be two members for German riparian states, one for each other riparian state and one for each non-riparian state which is at the time of constitution represented on the Commission. The Danube is of the utmost importance to Czechoslovakia which, with the Děčín coalfield, will be able to develop her industries and to supply S.E. Europe, Bratislava (Pressburg) on the Danube, at the junction of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, might develop greatly as a commercial centre with free zones and credit facilities, if Czechoslovakia maintains her present promise of enlightened rule.

ROUMANIA.

The slopes of the S.E. Carpathians have seen many movements of peoples in the lowlands beneath, but have kept largely an old-established broad-headed population like that of the mountain areas of Europe in general. From Roman Dacia it has inherited a Latin grammar and syntax and this is applied to a vocabulary rather more than half Slavonic. With the centuries, the hill people have spread plainwards on both sides of the mountains and are either cultivators or stock-raisers, but among the latter are shepherds who move their flocks seasonally up and down hill. These Vlach-speaking wanderers are also found in Macedonia, but the intensification of state-frontiers is hampering their movement and may cause them to merge in local populations.

The new and much enlarged Roumania suddenly made possible by victory is an attempt to gather together all

the Vlach-speaking people except those wanderers in Macedonia and the Greek hills. It is the realization of what had seemed a fantastic dream, but it involves grave difficulties for the new government in view of the wide diversities of the constituent parts of this state, which will have an area of nearly 120,000 square miles and probably 16,000,000 people when it has recovered from war and pestilence.

Wallachia and Moldavia are the older elements of Roumania with a population gathered especially along the rivers that run through the dry "loess" plain. Harvests are variable and wheat is grown therefore largely by big proprietors; maize, a more tolerant crop, is general, and mulberries and tobacco are important in Wallachia. Moldavia grows more maize than wheat, both grow the vine. They are the countries of a peasantry struggling for the break-up of immense estates and for a hold on its crops which have hitherto brought profits to landlords by exportation in huge quantities. This export trade has made Roumania deeply concerned about her outlets to the Black Sea and a comparison of pre-war and post-war maps will reveal a sensational change. South and east of the lower Danube is the steppe-like plateau of the Dobruja, better in the Bulgarian south, of which a part has now been awarded to Roumania for security for the connections from Cernavoda to the sea at Constantza, but against the linguistic principles of the treaty makers. Bessarabia is Roumanian save for a Bulgarian area in the south and Ruthenians in the north, its addition to Roumania in one sense gives that country security on the north side of the Danube, but in another brings her very near the Cossack lands.

Bukovina is to add its forest wealth to that which Roumania already possesses in the Carpathians, though the Roumanians are hardly a majority of the people. They are nevertheless the largest element. The inclusion of Bukovina and Bessarabia gives Roumania a frontier along the Dniester.

Transylvania had a Magyar aristocracy over a Vlach

peasantry and there is now a most dramatic reversal of political status. In addition to a large Magyar element in East Transylvania there are also German colonies of very old standing in the north and in the south-west. Here, therefore, Roumania will need great wisdom in dealing with important factors of local life which she cannot hope to assimilate to herself. While parts of Transylvania are agricultural and present the same problem of the peasant desire for land as do Wallachia and Moldavia, that part of western Transylvania which lies south of the Maros offers important resources in minerals, including veins of gold, silver, copper and lead as well as strata rich in iron that extend into the plain of the Banat.

Radium has recently been said to occur near the Maros in the Banat; coal and salt are both important and a petroleum supply may be developed. This is, therefore, a region of metallurgical industry (county of Hunyad). Forests are naturally very important in such a hilly country.

Finally, Roumania is to have the eastern part of the Banat of Temisoara, largely a cereal-growing plain in the east of which Vlachs are the largest element while Serbs predominate in numbers among the confused peoples in the west.

The new Roumania is, therefore, made up of many diverse elements though everywhere there is a Vlach peasantry still suffering from lack of education and far removed from the aristocracy, as is so often the case in East Central Europe. The fact that Jews form important middle class and financial elements especially in Bukovina, Moldavia, Bessarabia and the Dobruja, adds to her difficulties. Moreover, the Danube waterway and the railways before 1914 made industrial Germany the great source of supply for the Roumanian lands to such an extent that, in the ominous diagram of the Central European block in Partsch's "Central Europe," Roumania is identified fully with that block. Roumania adheres in the main to the Orthodox Church. This is

natural in view of its proximity to Constantinople, but there are many Uniates (p. 10) in Transylvania and elsewhere. It is, therefore, emphatically not Central European in religion; its towns, too, are distinctly eastern, save when they have been modernised.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

Bohemia within its hill frame was the earliest of the Slav lands to rise to national consciousness. Old trade connections led it at first to adopt Greek or Orthodox Christianity, but western associations made it Roman, and Taus (Domazlice) at the end of the pass from Bavaria was an early religious centre (*cf.* Gniezno and Cracow). Later, Prague superseded it and became in the Middle Ages almost a second Paris, with its university the oldest in the lands beyond the boundary of Imperial Rome. German influence and speech penetrated from the north, but whereas the same intrusions into France were assimilated by the Roman tradition, the competition in Bohemia between German and Czech was never resolved and the new state has to face the problem of an "Ulster" of the greatest importance industrially. Already in the 11th century Moravia was linked to Bohemia and so the outline of the new state was foreshadowed, as in other cases already mentioned, with the advent of definitive and widespread settlement in forest clearings. But, as the struggle with the Turk came into prominence, Vienna gathered Europe around her and Bohemia became a satellite of the Empire which had grown from the old March (Ostmark). The national self-consciousness, nevertheless, led to criticism of Rome under Hus (1402-15) along with the attempt to fix native speech. This attempt has been a characteristic feature of the life of Europe in many parts during the phase of definitive and widespread settlement already mentioned, and has led to linguistic conservatism ever since, so that, in recent centuries, languages change their boundaries slowly, if at all. The counter-reformation worked with anti-national fury in Bohemia, and here as elsewhere in

Central Europe the 19th century witnessed the great nationalist resurgence against Jesuit ideals. The result of the war, here as elsewhere, has suddenly changed dreams into realities, but here the realities have an old and firm background. If, therefore, the new state can achieve a *modus vivendi* with its German industrialists and can readjust temperately its old financial and commercial relations with Vienna, its future may well be a bright one.

Based upon Bohemia and Moravia, the new state also includes the hill countries of Slovak speech to the east as well as the northern strip formerly known as Austrian Silesia and a portion of Děčín (p. 59) with a coalfield. Its southern boundaries were difficult to settle. Linguistic frontiers are rarely linear, because of the tendency of the hill people to learn the speech of the market towns on the edges of the plains, and, besides, a frontier along foot-hills is unsatisfactory to the statelist. The plain south-west of the Tatra has, therefore, been given to Czechoslovakia, which thus has at Bratislava (Pressburg), an old Hungarian capital, a Danube port of great value. When war troubles are overpast the state may well have a population of 14,000,000, of whom over 10,000,000 will use one or other of the closely-related Slav languages. Forest and agriculture can give a basis of solid well-being, but Bohemia was formerly the premier industrial region of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with a great deal of its financial and general direction centred at Vienna. Some of its manufactures are old and renowned and it has coal and lignite and some little iron as well as salt. The internationalisation of the Elbe up to Prague and the Oder up to the Oppa confluence, the Czechoslovak free zones at Hamburg and Stettin, the possession of Bratislava on the international Danube and the right of transit to Trieste without customs dues must help Czechoslovakia commercially. At the eastern end of Slovakia, the Ruthenian population of the Carpathians occupies the hill-slopes towards the Hungarian plain

and it is to have local autonomy under Czechoslovakia. It should be a useful link with the Ukraine if this latter state materialises.

AUSTRIA.

The old Ostmark, the gate of the forest (p. 63), which gathered Europe around it to resist the Turk and maintained its imperial position by wary diplomacy and championship of the Church, was practically sentenced to death by Bismarck in 1866 though the débacle came only in 1918. The regions left to the new republic of Austria have no means of supporting one of the world's greatest cities and they have interesting local capitals which answer their purpose. Indeed, the region around Vienna would, of itself, by no means develop so great a capital as some of the others. Unfortunately, economic thought, which has so lagged behind thought about linguistics or even politics, has not yet risen to the conception of Vienna as an asset of the life of Europe, a nerve centre for the whole of Europe-of-the-Sea, a crossing place of routes between Constantinople and Antwerp, Danzig and Fiume, Hamburg and Salonika. It was suggested as a capital of the League of Nations, but this emphasises its doubtful diplomatic rather than its magnificent cultural traditions. A co-operative movement to save Vienna would resound through history and mark a great step towards European unity. The fragments of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire left to the new republic include the old Austria, with German-speaking additions here transferred from Hungary, Styria, Carinthia, which has chosen by plebiscite to remain Austrian. She also has the greater part of the old Alpine territories, except the valley of the Adige which goes to Italy, though the people are Tirolese and German-speaking southward from the main watershed to below Bolzano (Bozen). In this last case linguistic principles have given way to strategic ones, as has often happened in the treaties when linguistics would have given a decision in favour of ex-enemies. Perhaps in this case the better solution, had Europe

been more likely to settle down, would have been to create an autonomous state of the Tirol* under a general guarantee of neutrality. With that arrangement Italy might well have agreed to respect the linguistic boundary, and, judging from her wisdom in arrangements with the Yugoslavs, there seems little reason to doubt that she would have done so. Lovers of Wordsworth will feel sorely troubled that the Tirolese are now torn asunder, and yet Italy has strong claims to adequate protection and is likely to be wise. Austria, like Czechoslovakia, is to have freedom of access for her commerce to Trieste.

HUNGARY.

Hungary is being drastically treated. The Magyars, originally Asiatic, have long been Europeanised except in language, and among them are several of the tall blonds who contribute to the militant aristocracies of Europe. The old kingdom has a long history with many phases, fights with the Turks, subjection to Austria, and, finally (1867-1914), domination over people of other languages around its eastern and southern borders. This domination was of a most reprehensible type and in the Treaty every opportunity for a renewal of it has been summarily removed. Hungary has shrunk to the area occupied by Magyars save for very small areas such as the Slavs of Pech and a few German groups. In cases of doubt the verdict has been almost uniformly against Hungary, and in several regions the frontier puts Hungary at a strategical disadvantage. A line along the foot of ranges of hills is often an approximate language boundary and this type of frontier has been selected around the east side of Hungary, often on the Magyar side of the language-change. Croatia and Slavonia, formerly Hungarian with a nominal constitution of their own, go to Yugoslavia. The Backa between the lower Tisa (Thaya) and Danube also goes to Yugoslavia though largely Magyar. The Banat

* The people of the Tirol, outside Italian frontiers, have just cast a 98½% vote for union with Germany.

is divided between Yugoslavia and Roumania and the latter gets Transylvania. The northern hill-region goes to Czechoslovakia, also Bratislava (Pressburg), once the capital of Hungary, though it is really German. Before 1914 Hungary had about 21,000,000 people on 125,600 square miles: the new republic will have about 7,500,000 people on 35,000 square miles.

With the loss especially of Transylvania has gone the possibility of industrial development except as regards silk, though there is coal in the Pech district. The new state will be even more agricultural than the old one, but with the loss of prestige of the *ancien régime* we may expect some agricultural development by intensified use of the soil. The loss of the maize harvests of the Backa and Banat will tell heavily against stock-production. The forests are nearly all lost to Hungary. The rise of Yugoslavia means the cutting off of Hungary from the sea.

The new boundary comes rather near Budapest, which is otherwise remarkably well placed as a capital and a marketing city and, with low economic barriers, it could become prosperous and useful to surrounding lands especially owing to its fine position on the Danube. But its pre-war population of nearly a million seems almost impossible under the new conditions.

The severest losses will be in capacity for production in some cases, or for manufacture in others, of maize and hay, cattle and sheep and textiles.

The Magyar and Szekler groups in Transylvania will present problems both to the new Hungary and to the enlarged Roumania, and the new Hungary will have Magyars outside nearly all its frontiers, while, within the border, remains the greater part of the Jewish element of old Hungary, so the proportion of Jews in the population will be much increased.

It is, perhaps, well, before condemning the Magyars and saying it serves them right, for Englishmen to remember that the Magyar aristocracy were often called the English of the Continent, and analogies have been

drawn, especially between them and the English aristocracy in Ireland.

The discussion of Fiume, once, in effect, a port of Hungary, is best left to the next section.

ITALIAN GAINS AND THE ADRIATIC SETTLEMENT.— (*Figs. 9 and 10.*)

The extension of Italian rule to the Italian-speaking section of the Adige Valley, which was the old bishopric of Trent, was one of the most necessary changes in the political map of Europe. The pushing of the frontier right up to the great watershed is less justifiable, but strategic claims must be allowed to be strong unless the Tirol should become a small neutral state (p. 70).

In the Adriatic the new kingdom of Italy naturally inherited Venetian tradition, which, in its turn, had an inheritance from ancient Rome. This gave Italy claims upon the coasts of Istria and Dalmatia, and these claims, which long ago would have seemed natural enough, roused opposition from the recently-developed national consciousness among the Serbo-Croat-Slovene peoples. The treatment of the matter by the Governments on both sides has been admirable, and an agreement based upon mutual accommodation sets Italy in a position of unique eminence among the great powers of Europe.

The districts of Gorizia and Istria go to Italy, though Eastern Istria is Slav in speech, but Italy adjusts the boundary to give Yugoslavia a good frontier. Thanks to the important concessions by Yugoslavia, Italy thus secures her city of Trieste and its approaches. The islands of Cherso, Unie, Lussin and Sansigo go to Italy and are largely Italian in speech, but Asinello, just beyond the south point of Lussin, goes to Yugoslavia, which thus controls the main exit from the Quarnerolo, while Italy controls that from the Quarnero.

Fiume, with adjacent territory up to the new Italian frontier, becomes a free city under the protection of the League of Nations, so both sides may be said to give up something here. The trade relations of Fiume are not yet




Fig. 10. ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA.

settled. On the Dalmatian coast, Italy, in turn, forgoes her strong claims, but receives consideration, in that Zara, "Zara Italianissima" of history, becomes autonomous under her suzerainty, and the island of Lagosta in the far south is awarded to her. The rest of the coast and the islands go to Yugoslavia, and give the new state reasonable control of the coastline and of exits between the islands out to the Adriatic.

It should be said that the treaty leaves many more Yugoslavs under Italy than Italians under Yugoslavia, but this was almost inevitable.

THE BALKAN PENINSULA.—(Fig. 11.)

Owing to its large proportion of highland, and to retardations connected with Turkish rule, the peninsula is at a far earlier stage of evolution of the settled life than most of the other regions discussed. There is much seasonal movement of groups with flocks and herds, and among the more nomadic of these herders are some who use the Vlach language (p. 64), though the recent rise of nations, with their linear frontiers, has impeded the traditional movements of these wanderers. There is no great basin in the peninsula which could develop a dominant centre, a part of the peninsula (the Morava Valley) looks towards the Danube, the rest is in comparatively small basins opening out towards various seas which yet are separated enough to have little unifying influence. The contrasts, again, between coastland and highland in climate, cultivation and relations are often both marked and abrupt, and the civilisations which have waxed and waned in the coastal lands have only very moderately affected the main mass of the country.

The coast is a region of the olive, and has Greek affinities for the most part. Serbia has a farming population still in remote parts living in large family groups (Zadruga). Bulgaria has more peasant proprietors, Macedonia and Thrace have the regime of the Ciflik, the village being under a lord who once paid taxes to the Turk, and was often Muslim. The western mountains



Fig. 11. THE BALKAN PENINSULA.

have ancient landowners and leaders, confirmed in their position by the Turk on condition of acceptance of Islam (Albania and Bosnia).

The coast apart, Slavonic languages are almost universal, but Bulgar also has an Asiatic (so-called Tartar) element, and Albania preserves ancient dialects. Pre-war maps often made Macedonia Bulgar in speech for the most part, but this was partly the result of Bulgar schools. History may be quoted on every side, and we may yet see the experiment of an autonomous Macedonian state such as Lord Bryce and others have suggested.

THE BALKANS.—*I. Albania.*

The contrast and conflict between the Albanian and Slav is so old and so deep that the creation of an Albanian state, and especially the moderation of Italy in withdrawing, is to be applauded. She has a small watch party on Saseno Island, in front of Valona Bay, for the time being. The whole future of this state is a problem; the clans amongst the hills differ in religion and in dialect a good deal, and there is special difficulty.

The disputed region of Northern Epirus is a mixture of Muhammadan, Albanian and Orthodox Greek, and many people are bilingual. It is probable that there may be much disturbance, but there will be probably less than if Albania had been rent in pieces and portioned out to other states. Albania has been duly recognised by the League of Nations.

THE BALKANS.—*II. Yugoslavia.*

Like Czechoslovakia and Roumania, Yugoslavia finds her dreams suddenly realised. She will now include the enlarged Serbia of 1913, Montenegro, most of Dalmatia, Carniola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavonia and Croatia (formerly Austro-Hungarian), and she gets a much-needed protection for Belgrade through cession of the Backa (between Danube and Tisa) and the south-west of the Banat (see also p. 66). She will have an area of about 90,000 square miles, on which in 1914

there lived between 11,000,000 and 12,000,000 people, including 2,000,000 aliens. Carinthia by a plebiscite has decided to remain entirely Austrian, but it has been stated recently that a large part at least has been occupied by Yugoslavia, and a situation thus created which will need clearing up. The Backa and Banat are famous maize lands, and will increase Yugoslavia's stock farming. Her forest-fed pigs are famous, and her plums an important crop in spite of war losses. Report speaks of good post-war crops, and the country can send to Greece cereals, stock, skins, wood and sugar. Her currency is much less depreciated than that of Roumania or Czechoslovakia, both of which feel more deeply the dislocation of commerce. The control of most of the railway from Belgrade to Salonika and of the Belgrade-Nish section of the Orient Express line (to Constantinople) adds to the country's economic power. A canal from the Danube to Salonika is mentioned. The possession of Uskub (Skoplie) should gratify the historic sense of the people. The award of Monastir to them is more disputable, but is probably the least objectionable solution.

Yugoslavia's difficulty is the merging of districts long separated politically. Belgrade and Agram (Beograd and Zagreb) both have their traditions; the one is Orthodox, and uses the Cyrillic script, the other Romanist, using western script. The association of alphabet difference with religion, especially in the schools, makes complications, though the real language difference is not very deep. Under Austrian rule a number of aliens, many of them Hungarian Jews, have done a good deal to develop Bosnia economically, and will need consideration. Montenegro may not remain content under the new scheme, and is said to be developing communism of some kind. A federal organisation of the very diverse areas is the line of least resistance, but it may well be dangerous in the end.

Mention is made of relations to Italy (p. 72), to Bulgaria, and to Greece (p. 78) in the notes on those countries.

THE BALKANS.—III. *Bulgaria.*

Bulgaria has lost heavily on all hands. The southern Dobruja goes to Roumania, though its people are Bulgar (p. 65). Between Nish and Sofia the frontier is moved dangerously near the latter to give Yugoslavia a strong grip of the frontier pass. Strumica, which became Bulgar in 1913, is given up to Yugoslavia, and the Belgrade-Salonika line is thus set well away from the frontier. Under the Treaty of Sèvres, Greece would get Thrace, including the district of Adrianople, and if this is ratified Bulgaria is cut off from the Ægean, save that Greece is to allow her access to Dede Agach and some rights there. As, however, her route to Dede Agach will be under Greek Administration, its value to her is problematic. Both on this ground and on that of Turkish sentiment concerning Adrianople it would seem to be the way of peace to give the Straits Commission considerable power over Thrace, at least for a number of years. The Maritsa is to be internationalised if Bulgaria or the owners of Thrace so desire.

THE BALKANS.—IV. *Greece.*

Greece stands to gain enormously if the Treaty of Sèvres is maintained in spite of the return of Constantine. She has, at any rate, got the Macedonian coast and Salonika assured to her, and she may extend right through Thrace to the Black Sea, though the Sultan is to remain at Constantinople, and she will thus avoid responsibility for the great inter-continental city. She may be confirmed in the possession of all the isles of the Ægean, except Rhodes, which Italy will administer for 15 years before taking a plebiscite. Here again an arrangement has been reached, thanks to Italian moderation. A large district around Smyrna, under the terms of the unratified treaty, is placed in the hands of the Greek Government for administration and a plebiscite after five years. Greece thus approaches her ancient dimensions, and is unquestioned mistress of the Ægean.

The question of Cyprus will apparently come up for discussion later on. The boundary between Greece and Albania is not settled. Turkey is allowed certain rights at Smyrna, and should have them guaranteed internationally; there is the gravest need for protection of minorities by international authorities.

THE BALKANS.—V. *A General Note.*

The sharpening of economic barriers in the peninsula is regrettable for, with low dues, they might supply one another more largely, and avoid imports from distant lands to some extent. Yugoslavia, Roumania, and Bulgaria could supply Greece with cereals, stock products, sugar, wood, petrol and metal. Greece could supply wine, oil, tobacco, etc., and provide transport and commercial services. A Balkan bank at Salonika, with national banks affiliated to it, could help towards understanding and peace, especially with grants of free zones at that port. But the way of co-operation is hard to tread for peoples bred on ancient enmities, and still at a fairly early stage (inland) of the development of settled life.

Constantinople.

The Sultan's territory in Europe has all but vanished, the boundary of what is nominally his being now approximately the famed Chatalja lines, save that Lake Derkos, the city's reservoir, is included in its territory. It is provided that the Sultan is to stay at Constantinople subject to his proper treatment of minorities in Asia, whatever that may be held to mean. The navigation of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, and Bosphorus is to be fully open to all nations, in peace and in war, and there is to be no blockade or act of hostilities within this zone, save for the purpose of carrying out a decree of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire,* France,* Italy,* Japan,* Greece, Roumania and Bulgaria, are to appoint representatives on a "Commission of the Straits," and the United States of America* and Russia*

are to do the same if and when they join the League. The asterisked powers will have two votes each. The Commission will control and execute any works for the benefit of maritime commerce and the British Empire. France and Italy have to provide forces for the occupation of the zone of the Straits under the command of the League Council. The general control of orders for navigation and transport by water is in the hands of the Commission. The power of the Sultan is, therefore, shadowy; he remains largely as a concession to the religious sentiment of the Muslim world, and at any rate his presence there may help to make Constantinople a place where Muslim and Christian can learn to know one another better. There is every reason, as in the case of Vienna, for earnest co-operative effort on behalf of Constantinople, which might well have a great university on new lines for interchange of thought between east and west.

The Mediterranean.

Assuming that Greece does really get what the Turkish Treaty mentions, namely, the Ægean Isles and the European shores of that sea, together with the effective control of Smyrna; that France and Britain maintain their positions in Syria and Palestine and Mesopotamia; that Italy, with Trieste and safety in the Adriatic, improves her Mediterranean position in both east and south, and that France develops her Mauretanian domains, then the long severance of the two sides of the Mediterranean will have been brought to an end. The control of the Great Sea will once more be in the hands of the representatives (and descendants) of the classical civilisations — Greece, Italy, France, Spain and Britain. European interest in the Mediterranean could not but grow after the opening of the Suez Canal, and an important aspect of the war of 1914-18 was a question whether that sea should be controlled by the children of Greece and Rome or by the peoples beyond the ancient empire. As Constantinople is to such a large extent under the

League, it may be hoped that before many years the effective influence in the Mediterranean may be a League then representing all Europe and the ancient civilisations of the East as well, *i.e.*, that we may reach in connection with the great sea of civilisation a synthesis far surpassing that reached in antiquity after Rome defeated Carthage and ended a previous severance of the two sides.

ADDENDUM

(see page 50)

17 May, 1921. The Åland Islands Commission of the League of Nations endorses Finland's historic claim to the Åland Islands, enacting at the same time that Swedish shall be the language of the schools, that Ålanders shall have right of pre-emption of island property in process of sale to outsiders, and that newcomers shall get the franchise only after five years' residence. The islanders are to be allowed to select candidates for the governorship of the islands.

A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

The well-known standard reference books include the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, *Chambers' Encyclopædia*, *Réclus' "Géographie Universelle"* (also in English), the *International Geography*, the "*Dictionnaire de Géographie Universelle*" of Vivien de St. Martin, and many others of general import. *Ratzel's Anthropogéographie* and *Brunhes' "La Géographie Humaine"* may be added here.

On Race Questions the standard work and guide to the older literature is *W. Z. Ripley's* great work on the races of Europe, supplemented by *G. Sergi's "Europa"* (in Italian) and by a number of papers by *A. Keith*, *Parsons Peake*, and *Fleure* in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* during the past ten years. The new edition of *Keane's "Man, Past and Present"* is invaluable.

On Languages and their Distribution the student may begin by consulting *A. Meillet, "Les Langues dans l'Europe Nouvelle"* and *L. Dominian* on "*Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe.*" From these books a bibliography can be compiled to suit the student's purpose.

The evolution of social conditions in Europe is so complex that it has not as yet received synthetic treatment, but some tentative efforts are useful if read critically. Among them one may note the files of *La Science Sociale* and *Demolins' "Comment la route crée le type social,"* *Guizot's "Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe,"* *Kropotkin's "Mutual Aid," "Fields, Factories and Workshops"* and "*Memoirs of a Revolutionist,*" as well as *Jenks' works*, such as the little "*History of Politics,*" and *Geddes' "Cities in Evolution."*

It is impossible to give an adequate list of books on special regions, but the following will be found of value for various parts of the Continent involved in the recent treaties :—

P. Vidal de la Blache, "Tableau de la Géographie de la France"; *P. Vidal de la Blache, "La France de l'Est";* *R. Blanchard, "La Flandre";* *H. J. Mackinder, "The Rhine";* "*Atlas de Finlande*"; *P. Leroy Beaulieu, "The Empire of the Tsars";* *A. B. Boswell, "Poland and the Poles";* *J. Cvijic, "La Péninsule Balkanique";* *M. I. Newbigin, "Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems";* *M. E. Durham, "The Burden of the Balkans";* *E. de Martonne, "La Valachie";* *A. Philippson, "Das Mittelmeergebiet"* *D. G. Hogarth, "The Nearer East."*

Further guidance to books on regions of Europe will be found in the valuable handbooks issued by the British Government in two series *i.e.*, the handbooks issued by the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty, and the handbooks issued by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office.

The reader interested in some of the problems may wish to consult J. Fairgrieve's "Geography and World-Power," H. J. Mackinder's "Democratic Ideals and Reality," H. J. Fleure's "Human Geography in Western Europe," and C. B. Fawcett's "Frontiers."

The standard journals have naturally issued many important articles, among which should be named particularly the valuable ones by A. R. Hinks, L. W. Lyde and others in the *Geographical Journal*, on the new boundaries and allied topics, and articles by M. I. Newbigin in that journal and in the *Scottish Geographical Magazine*.

The new Times Atlas is a triumph of workmanship and may be supplemented on the historical side by use of the well-known historical atlases of F. Schrader, Diercke, Poole, Ramsay Muir and others.

The series of Government publications giving texts of the treaties with maps, the publications of the League of Nations (publishers Messrs. Harrison, 44 St. Martin's Lane) and the publications of the League of Nations Union all contain valuable information.

Of books on the treaties special interest attaches to J. M. Keynes' "Economic Consequences of the Peace" and M. I. Newbigin's "Aftermath."

